Foremost Ins. Co. Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Bufflap, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214675 (Pa. Middle Dist. Court, November 26, 2024) (P. Wilson, J.)
Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment, both of which ask the court to determine whether Defendant Tracy Bufflap (“Bufflap”) is entitled to underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage under the antique automobile insurance policy provided by Plaintiff Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan (“Foremost”). (Docs. 27 and 30.) For the reasons that follow, Foremost’s motion will be granted and Bufflap’s motion will be denied.
Foremost filed the instant action via complaint on December 6, 2023. (Doc. 1.) Foremost asked the court to enter declaratory judgment that Bufflap is not entitled to benefits under the Foremost policy because he does not meet the definition of “insured” in the UIM endorsement. (Id. at 10.) Bufflap filed an answer and counterclaim on February 13, 2024. (Doc. 6.) The counterclaims ask the court to enter declaratory judgment that Bufflap was entitled to UIM coverage under the Foremost policy, as well as allege a breach of contract claim against Foremost for denying Bufflap’s claims for stacked UIM coverage.
Foremost has presented the court with persuasive precedent regarding antique automobile policies that is squarely on point with the case before us. In Grudkowski, the Middle District of Pennsylvania considered whether a similar definition to the definition at issue here rendered stacked UM/UIM coverage illusory because requiring an insured to be in the “covered auto” at the time of the accident meant there can never be inter-policy stacking benefits under the policy. Grudkowski, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30567, 2013 WL 816666 at *3. The district court held that “as a matter of law, [insurers] may sell antique automobile insurance policies in Pennsylvania which do not allow for the stacking of coverages.” 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30567, [WL] at *4. The district court relied on cases involving antique auto policies, which examined “the reasonable expectations of the insured.” 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30567, [WL] at *6 (citing St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 428 Pa. Super. 54, 630 A.2d 28, 29 (Pa. Super. 1993)). The district court also noted that “while reasonable expectations of the insured are the focal point in interpreting the contractual language of insurance policies, ‘an insured may not complain that his or her reasonable expectations were frustrated by [insurance] policy limitations which are clear and unambiguous.'” Id. (citing Corbett, 630 A.2d at 29)). Finally, the Grudkowski district court noted that antique auto policies “are issued to serve functions distinct from that of personal automobile policies, which is what allows insurers to charge lower premiums for antique automobile policies[,]” and requiring insurers to provide stacked benefits with these policies would “caus[e] a drastic increase in premiums for this type of insurance.” 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30567, [WL] at 9. In an unpublished decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court and held that “the [MVFRL] contemplates stacking, but it can be waived, or limited by ‘clear and unambiguous’ policy language.” Grudkowski, 556 Fed. App’x at 168 (citations omitted.) With this understanding, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim “[b]ecause the limited antique car insurance Foremost sold was permissible under Pennsylvania’s MVFRL, and because the contract clearly limited coverage and [plaintiff] had not alleged that her insurance contracts with Foremost were breached in any other way[.]”
Here, the court will follow the reasoning of Bish because it examines the exact issue before the court—the definition of “insured” in an antique automobile policy. As noted above, allowing insurers to limit coverage in antique auto policies is consistent with the policy objectives of lowering costs contained in the MVFRL. See Werley, 114 F.4th at 212. Based on the same rationale stated in Bish, the court will not invalidate the definition of insured in the Foremost policy.
