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EVIDENCE-PRIOR CRIMINAL ACT-ADMISSABILITY

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 2024 Pa. LEXIS 1061 (U.S. Supr. Ct. July 22, 2024) (Brobson, J.)

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, United States Supreme Court decided July 22, 2024.

The question is this case is whether the state should follow the federal rule. The federal rule is that Ohler v. U.S., 529 U.S 753, 760 (2000) in the Supreme Court of The United States held that under federal law defendant who is unsuccessful in persuading a trial court to exclude evidence of a prior conviction, in the context of a motion in limine and then preemptively introduces that evidence cannot claim an appeal at the trial court’s admissibility ruling was an error. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the same rule does not apply in state court.

While this is a criminal case that undoubtedly would apply in civil cases.

…we conclude that the Ohler majority’s holding is at odds with Pennsylvania precedent. Turning to our rules of evidence, we emphasize that Rule 103 explicitly provides that: (1) “[a] party may claim error in a ruling to admit . . . evidence” when a party, inter alia, “makes a . . . motion in limine;” and (2) “a party need not renew an objection . . . to preserve a claim of error for appeal” once a trial court “rules definitively on the record.” Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(A), (b). Moreover, our rules of evidence are to be “applied so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.” Pa.R.E. 102. Notwithstanding any similarities between our rules of evidence and their federal counterparts, we reiterate that, at bottom, this Court is not bound by Ohler in deciding the issue presented to us today. Upon careful review, we, like most of other states to have considered this issue, conclude that the majority rule in Ohler is in tension with our state rules and that notions of fairness weigh in favor of adopting the approach of the Ohler dissent. Finally, while it is obvious that the issue before us is subject to much scholarly discourse, we need not provide a lengthy discussion of that discourse here. It suffices to say that, undisputedly, a majority of the scholarship on the topic likewise takes the view of the Ohler dissent, providing further support for our adoption of that view today. See, e.g., Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d at 482-83 (observing that Ohler holding is “against the great weight of academic authority”).

…we hold that a defendant does not waive his or her right to appellate review of the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes under the circumstances presented—i.e., where the defendant preemptively introduces that evidence on direct examination following a trial court’s definitive ruling against him on a motion in limine. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand this matter for the Superior Court to consider the merits of Appellant’s evidentiary challenge.

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy and McCaffery join the opinion.