Coryell v. Morris, 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 49 (Pa. Superior Ct., January 31, 2025)
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: Domino’s Pizza LLC (“Domino’s”) appeals from the judgment entered against it, its franchisee Robizza, Inc. (“Robizza”), and Robizza’s employee, Steven Morris, and in favor of Clarence David Coryell and his wife, Sandra Coryell. We affirm. On July 27, 2016, Mr. Morris, while delivering Domino’s pizzas for Robizza, made a left turn into Mr. Coryell, who was on his motorcycle. Mr. Coryell suffered such severe injuries to his leg that, despite ten surgeries to repair the damage, amputation was deemed the most likely option to manage his pain and increase his mobility. The Coryells filed the instant action in 2018 against Mr. Morris, Robizza, and Domino’s, stating claims of negligence and loss of consortium. Both Domino’s and the Coryells moved for summary judgment on the issue of the liability of Domino’s for Mr. Morris’s negligence.2 The Coryells asserted that the Domino’s standard franchise agreement, which Robizza executed in 2006 (“Franchise Agreement”), allowed Domino’s such authority to control the operation of Robizza that Domino’s was vicariously liable for Robizza’s negligence. Domino’s, on the other hand, contended that the control it had pursuant to the Franchise Agreement and its operating standards merely protected the quality of the end product, not the day-to-day operation of the franchise. The trial court, concluding that there remained genuine issues of material fact to be decided by the jury, denied both motions.
At trial, Domino’s moved for a compulsory nonsuit at the close of the Coryells’ case, again asserting that they had failed to prove that Domino’s had the right to control, or exerted actual control over, Robizza’s operations such that it was vicariously liable for Robizza’s negligence. The trial court denied the motion. Ultimately, the jury found that Mr. Morris negligently caused the collision and that Domino’s “exercised or had the right to exercise sufficient control over [Robizza] such that [Domino’s was] vicariously liable” for the Coryells’ damages in the amount of $2,109,553. Domino’s filed a timely post-trial motion requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) as to the question of its vicarious liability, while the Coryells filed a motion for delay damages. The trial court denied the former and granted the latter, setting the new damages total at $2,337,279.41. The Coryells entered judgment on the verdict in that amount, and Domino’s promptly filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, both Domino’s and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In determining whether the relationship between two parties triggers vicarious liability, the focus is on the control that the purported principal has over the purported agent “with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the services for which he was engaged[.]” Cox v. Caeti, 444 Pa. 143, 279 A.2d 756, 758 (Pa. 1971).
Green v. Indep. Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207, 210 (Pa. 1964). Phrased differently, “[a] servant is an agent whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right of control by the master; that is, a master controls not only the results of the work, but the manner in which the work is to be performed.” Juarbe v. City of Philadelphia, 288 Pa. Super. 330, 431 A.2d 1073, 1076 (Pa.Super. 1981). “It is the element of continuous subjection to the will of the principal which distinguishes the agency agreement from other agreements.” Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 430 Pa. Super. 315, 634 A.2d 622, 626 (Pa.Super. 1993).
In the context of a franchisor-franchisee relationship, the question of the agency is answered by examining “whether the alleged master has day-to-day control over the manner of the alleged servant’s performance.” Id. If an agreement gives the principal the right to control the agent’s day-to-day performance, then it matters not whether the principal actually exercised that right. See Coleman v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 477 Pa. 414, 383 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. 1978) (“The test is thus framed in terms of the right and power to exercise such control, not in terms of whether the right and power were actually exercised or whether they were delegated to another.”). However, evidence of actual control exerted by the principal outside of the parties’ agency agreement may also establish a level of control that gives rise to vicarious liability. See George v. Nemeth, 426 Pa. 551, 233 A.2d 231, 233 (Pa. 1967) (“Although the Distribution Agreement signed by Nemeth and Freihofer specifically refers to their relationship as being one of an independent contractor, this is not determinative of the matter for it is the actual practice between the parties which is crucial.”).
It is well-settled that “[i]f the facts as to such relationship are in dispute, it is the function of a jury to determine the precise nature of the relationship between the parties[.]” Cox, 279 A.2d at 758 (citing Feller v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 363 Pa. 483, 70 A.2d 299, 300 (Pa. 1950)). See also Juarbe, 431 A.2d at 1076 (same). It is only “where the facts are not in dispute, [that] the question of the relationship becomes one for determination by the court[.]” Cox, 279 A.2d at 758. Trial court properly tasked the jury with deciding whether Domino’s had de facto or de jure control over Robizza such that Robizza was the agent of Domino’s for purposes of vicarious liability. Indeed, a review of Domino’s motion for JNOV and the Coryells’ response readily reveals the conflicting facts presented at trial.
In sum, the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict in this case is sound. Domino’s control over Robizza, which exceeded mere protection of its brand and trademark, was sufficiently robust and extensive to deem Robizza its servant or agent for purposes of vicarious liability for the negligence of Robizza’s employee.11 Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Domino’s motion for JNOV and the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict. Judgment affirmed.