STANDING-STATES AS HAVING STANDING

United States v. Texas, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2639 (S. Ct. June 23, 2023) (Kavanaugh, J.) In 2021, after President Biden took office, the Department of Homeland Security issued new Guidelines for immigration enforcement. The Guidelines prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals, or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. Texas and Louisiana sued the Department of Homeland Security. According to those States, the Department’s new Guidelines violate federal statutes that purportedly require the Department to arrest more criminal noncitizens pending their removal. The States essentially want the Federal Judiciary to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policy so as to make more arrests. But this Court has long held “that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973). Consistent with that fundamental Article III principle, we conclude that the States lack Article III standing to bring this suit. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560-561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351. The District Court found that the States would incur additional costs because the Federal Government is not arresting more noncitizens. Monetary costs are of course an injury. But this Court has “also stressed that the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable.” Raines, 521 U. S., at 819, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849. That “requires, among other things,” that the “dispute is traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process”—in other words, that the asserted injury is traditionally redressable in federal court. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472, 102 S. Ct. 752, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700. In adhering to that core principle, the Court has examined “history and tradition,” among other things, as “a meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider.” Sprint Communs. Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 274, 128 S. Ct. 2531, 171 L. Ed. 2d 424 (2008); see TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___-___, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 210 L. Ed. 2d 568 (slip op., at 8-9). The States have not cited any precedent, history, or tradition of courts ordering the Executive Branch to change its arrest or prosecution policies so that the Executive Branch makes more arrests or initiates more prosecutions. On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit. The leading precedent is Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973). The plaintiff in that case contested a State’s policy of declining to prosecute certain child-support violations. This Court decided that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the State’s policy, reasoning that in “American jurisprudence at least,” a party “lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution . . . of another.” Id., at 619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536. The Court concluded that “a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Ibid. In short, this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice establish that the States’ suit here is not the kind redressable by a federal court. In sum, the States have brought an extraordinarily unusual lawsuit. They want a federal court to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policies so as to make more arrests. Federal courts have not traditionally entertained that kind of lawsuit; indeed, the States cite no precedent for a lawsuit like this. The States lack Article III standing because this Court’s precedents and the “historical experience” preclude the States’ “attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form.” Raines, 521 U. S., at 829, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849. And because the States lack Article III standing, the District Court did not have jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the District Court. It is so ordered.