Lamberson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 335 A.3d 423 (April 2, 2025) Covey, J.
Judges: BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge, HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge. OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY.
Opinion by: ANNE E. COVEY
SEPTA owns, operates, and maintains the Bristol train station located at the Washington Street and Prospect Street intersection in Bristol, Pennsylvania. On October 10, 2018, Lamberson was walking on the concrete platform on the southbound side of the Bristol train station train tracks. While stepping from the platform onto a waiting train, a portion of the concrete platform cracked beneath Lamberson’s foot and her foot and leg slipped into the hole, causing her to fall. Lamberson claimed that she sustained serious and disabling injuries as a result of the fall. On July 28, 2020, Lamberson and her husband, Albert Lamberson, filed an Amended Complaint in the trial court.
Lamberson argues that the trial court erred by granting the nonsuit because she presented evidence that, if believed by the jury, established that SEPTA had constructive notice that the train platform was in disrepair and needed repairs before the accident. Lamberson asserts that to impose liability under what is commonly known as the Sovereign Immunity Act (Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8564, a plaintiff only needs to prove that SEPTA had constructive notice of the defect. Lamberson contends that a video SEPTA took of the accident, which she introduced into evidence, along with three photographs, showing a view of the location where she fell and the platform’s
substantial deterioration, that were admitted into evidence without objection, were sufficient to establish constructive notice. Lamberson cites Carletti v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 190 A.3d 766 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), Angell v. Dereno, 134 A.3d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), and Miller v. Lykens Borough Authority, 712 A.2d 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), to support her position.
SEPTA rejoins that Lamberson presented no testimony from a SEPTA employee or an expert to show that the alleged dangerous condition could have been discovered on reasonable inspection, and the cases she relies on are inapposite. SEPTA further retorts that Lamberson commuted to work daily on the train, and she did not notice any problem with the platform, as evidenced by her testimony that the platform crumbled without warning. Further, SEPTA asserts that the video shows the platform suddenly collapsing. SEPTA therefore maintains that on this record, the evidence was insufficient to show that SEPTA knew or should have known of a dangerous condition of the platform that caused its collapse. SEPTA declares that the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence.
However, because it is a prerequisite that an action must be maintainable at common law, and at common law the action required such notice, the [C]ommonwealth agency must have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition to maintain an action under the exception to sovereign immunity. For the governmental entity to be charged with constructive notice of a dangerous condition of a roadway, the condition had to be apparent upon reasonable inspection. See Good v. City of Phila[.], . . . 335 Pa. 13, 6 A.2d 101 ([Pa.] 1939); Dep[‘t] of Transp[.] v. Patton, 546 Pa. 562, 686 A.2d 1302 . . . ([Pa.] 1997).
[N]otice of a latent defect in the placement of the fill that could not be discerned upon reasonable inspection cannot be imputed to the [Utility] simply because it created the dangerous condition. . . [T]he . . . plaintiffs[] were not excused from establishing that the [Utility] had actual or constructive notice of the latent defect in time to correct it, even though it was the [Utility’s] negligence that created the dangerous condition.
Miller, 712 A.2d at 803 (emphasis added). While Lamberson relies on Miller to support her position that the issue of notice must go to a jury, Miller supports SEPTA’s position that the occurrence of an accident does not prove a dangerous condition.
This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s reasoning. Lamberson did not present any evidence that the alleged dangerous condition was “apparent upon reasonable inspection[,]” Carletti, 190 A.3d at 777, thus “reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion” that Lamberson did not establish constructive notice. Id. (quoting Patton, 686 A.2d at 1305). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by entering a nonsuit.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
