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Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2786, 600 U.S. ___ (2023). Robert Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern as a freight-car mechanic for nearly 20 years, first in Ohio, then in Virginia. During his time with the company, Mr. Mallory contends, he was responsible for spraying boxcar pipes with asbestos and handling chemicals in the railroad’s paint shop. He also demolished car interiors that, he alleges, contained carcinogens. After Mr. Mallory left the company, he moved to Pennsylvania for a period before returning to Virginia. Along the way, he was diagnosed with cancer. Attributing his illness to his work for Norfolk Southern, Mr. Mallory hired Pennsylvania lawyers and sued his former employer in Pennsylvania state court under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51-60. That law creates a workers’ compensation scheme permitting railroad employees to recover damages for their employers’ negligence. See Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U. S. 158, 165-166, 127 S. Ct. 799, 166 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2007). Norfolk Southern resisted Mr. Mallory’s suit on constitutional grounds. By the time he filed his complaint, the company observed, Mr. Mallory resided in Virginia. His complaint alleged that he was exposed to carcinogens in Ohio and Virginia. Meanwhile, the company itself was incorporated in Virginia and had its headquarters there too. On these facts, Norfolk Southern submitted, any effort by a Pennsylvania court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it would offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Mallory saw things differently. He noted that Norfolk Southern manages over 2,000 miles of track, operates 11 rail yards, and runs 3 locomotive repair shops in Pennsylvania. He also pointed out that Norfolk Southern has registered to do business in Pennsylvania in light of its “‘regular, systematic, [and] extensive’” operations there. 266 A. 3d 542, 562 (Pa. 2021); see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411(a) (2014). That is significant, Mr. Mallory argued, because Pennsylvania requires out-of-state companies that register to do business in the Commonwealth to agree to appear in its courts on “any cause of action” against them. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i), (b) (2019); see 266 A. 3d, at 564. By complying with this statutory scheme, Mr. Mallory contended, Norfolk Southern had consented to suit in Pennsylvania on claims just like his. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided with Norfolk Southern. Yes, Mr. Mallory correctly read Pennsylvania law. It requires an out-of-state firm to answer any suits against it in exchange for status as a registered foreign corporation and the benefits that entails. 266 A. 3d, at 561-563. But, no, the court held, Mr. Mallory could not invoke that law because it violates the Due Process Clause. Id., at 564-568. In reaching this conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged its disagreement with the Georgia Supreme Court, which had recently rejected a similar due process argument from a corporate defendant. Id., at 560, n. 13 (citing Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 312 Ga. 422, 863 S. E. 2d 81 (2021)). In light of this split of authority, we agreed to hear this case and decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from requiring an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business there. 596 U. S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2646, 212 L. Ed. 2d 605 (2022). The question before us is not a new one. In truth, it is a very old question—and one this Court resolved in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917). There, the Court unanimously held that laws like Pennsylvania’s comport with the Due Process Clause. An in personam suit against an individual “for injuries that might have happened any where” was generally considered a “transitory” action that followed the individual. Id., at 294. All of which meant that a suit could be maintained by anyone on any claim in any place the defendant could be found. Relevant here, both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, they adopted statutes requiring out-of-state corporations to consent to in-state suits in exchange for the rights to exploit the local market and to receive the full range of benefits enjoyed by in-state corporations. All told, when Mr. Mallory sued, Norfolk Southern employed nearly 5,000 people in Pennsylvania. It maintained more than 2,400 miles of track across the Commonwealth. Its 70-acre locomotive shop there was the largest in North America. Contrary to what it says in its brief here, the company even proclaimed itself a proud part of “the Pennsylvania Community.” To date, our personal jurisdiction cases have never found a Due Process Clause problem sounding in federalism when an out-of-state defendant submits to suit in the forum State. The company does not dispute that it has filed paperwork with Pennsylvania seeking the right to do business there. It does not dispute that it has established an office in the Commonwealth to receive service of process on any claim. It does not dispute that it appreciated the jurisdictional consequences attending these actions and proceeded anyway, presumably because it thought the benefits outweighed the costs. But, in the name of the Due Process Clause, Norfolk Southern insists we should dismiss all that as a raft of meaningless formalities.