Dawes vs. The Williamsport Home (June 6, 2025) Carlucci, J. NO. 2025-00381
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, filed March 19, 2025, is 85 paragraphs long, and asserts claims in four (4) counts. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim is that Ronald Dawes received negligent care from the Defendant regarding his thoracic surgical wound. At Count I, Plaintiffs assert a claim in negligence. Paragraph 59 contained within Count I alleges failure of the Defendant to comply with a variety of state and federal regulations, most of which have nothing whatsoever to do with wound care. Count II is also a claim in negligence but appears to assert vicarious liability. In the view of the Court, vicarious liability is a theory of liability, as distinguished from a separate cause of action. Count III appears to assert a claim of corporate liability pursuant to Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012). Count IV appears to assert a claim by Co-Plaintiff Barbara Dawes for loss of consortium.
At Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege common law negligence by the Defendant and claim that Defendant violated a variety of regulations applicable to the care of Ronald Dawes. While asserting those claims does not make it so, Plaintiffs are entitled to an opportunity to discover facts in support of those claims. Should discovery fail to produce any basis for the claims asserted at Count I, Defendant is entitled to seek relief pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.2.
No demurrer will yet be entered to Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages, but Plaintiffs will be directed to file an Amended Complaint which either deletes any claim for punitive
damages or affirmatively sets forth material allegations of fact to support a claim for punitive damages under 40 P.S. § 1303.505.
It appears from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiffs claim that Defendant’s agents and employees failed to provide Ronald Dawes with the proper and required treatment for his thoracic surgical wound. Assuming that to be true, and if Plaintiffs establish agency, Plaintiffs may be entitled to judgment on Count I of their Complaint. The Court has not yet determined how that claim differs from the claim asserted at Count III. That fac notwithstanding, the Court cannot say with certainty that discovery will not reveal facts upon which Plaintiffs may rely on to assert a separate claim for corporate liability under the rule established in Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012). Should discovery fail to produce any basis for the claims asserted at Count III, Defendant is entitled to seek relief pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.2.
Paragraph 56 contained alleges failure of the Defendant to comply with a variety of state and federal regulations, most of which have nothing whatsoever to do with wound care. On the contrary, the forty-four (44) subparagraphs address resident bed placement preferences (a); food storage (b); resident notification regarding payment coverage (c); supplemental oxygen provisions (d); and a variety of other concerns. It is difficult for the Court to understand how the finder of fact could conclude that Defendant’s alleged failure to properly store food or provide timely resident notice of changes in payment coverage, or oxygen availability to other residents, could have been a substantial factor in bringing about Plaintiffs’ claimed damages. Rather, Paragraph 56 appears to be a laundry list of Defendant’s failures upon inspection, the vast majority of which were completely unrelated to Plaintiffs’ claims. As such, they will be stricken, but for those related to Plaintiffs’ claims.
