Outterbridge v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 2025 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 4 (September 12, 2024) Foglietta, J.
Opinion by Judge Angelo J. Foglietta.
This is the appeal of Plaintiff Darren Outterbridge, individually and as administrator of the estate of Yhvetta P. Outterbridge, following a jury’s determination that Defendants Abington Memorial Hospital, Suzanne Shorten, M.D., Kenneth S. Weiss, D.O., and Brent C. Beddis, D.O., did not breach the standard of care necessary to provide proper medical care and services to Mrs. Outterbridge whose cause of death at thirty-nine years old was disputed at trial.
The Trial Court committed reversible error by improperly precluding Plaintiff’s counsel from impeaching Defendants’ expert cardiology witness, Eliot Gerber, MD, and Brent Beddis, DO, with standard literature, a Heart Rhythm Society/American Heart Association Expert Consensus Statement, that Plaintiff’s expert had already authenticated, and which contradicted Defendants’ witnesses’ testimony.
A fact witness’s credibility may be challenged on cross-examination with respect to any publication in the field that he considers generally reliable. Crespo v. Hughes, 2017 PA Super 230, 167 A.3d 168, 182 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citing Majdic, supra at 339) [emphasis added]. See also Burton-Lister v. Siegel, Sivitz & Lebed Assocs., 2002 PA Super 128, 798 A.2d 231, 239 (Pa.Super. 2002) (finding it permissible to cross-examine defendant physician with a publication that he deemed authoritative). Dr. Beddis testified in this trial as a fact witness, despite defense counsel’s reference to him as an “expert” in opening statements.
It would have been an abuse of discretion if this Court would have allowed Plaintiff to question Dr. Beddis regarding an article that he was unfamiliar with, in a medical journal that was not established to be relied on as standard in his field of primary care. This Court advised Plaintiff correctly that Dr. Beddis, as a fact witness, could be questioned about articles that are generally relied on in their respective fields, but Plaintiff’s counsel could not establish through testimony that this article was just that.
While it is certainly proper to impeach an expert witness with a treatise or other form of authenticated literature when the expert or another expert in the field attests to the publication’s reliability, that impeachment must still be relevant to the issue before the Court. Charlton v. Troy, 2020 PA Super 170, 2020 PA Super 170, 236 A.3d 22 (2020), see J.S. v. Whetzel, 2004 PA Super 406, 860 A.2d 1112 (holding that “a party may impeach an expert witness… [but] this inquiry must nevertheless be relevant to the main issue before the court.”). A fundamental and irreconcilable flaw with Plaintiff’s desire to use “standard literature” in the field of cardiology is that the standard of care for what a cardiologist would do is not relevant to what a primary care physician would do and is not binding on a primary care physician. Here, whether an expert cardiologist believed that Mrs. Outterbridge needed an echocardiogram and whether the “standard of care” required a cardiologist who knew of a recent familial death due to an “unknown cardiac cause” to send a patient for an echocardiogram was not relevant to the ultimate matter before the Court which was whether the defendant family care physicians breached their standard of care in not referring Mrs. Outterbridge to a cardiologist.
In a medical malpractice action, a treating doctor may only testify as to his or her own experience without being presented as an expert witness. Lykes v. Yates, 2013 PA Super 258, 77 A.3d 27 (Super. Pa. 2013). See also Brady v. Ballay, Thornton, Maloney Medical Assocs., Inc., 704 A.2d 1076, 1082 (Pa.Super.1997), appeal denied, 555 Pa. 738, 725 A.2d 1217 (1998) (“[A] physician who is also a defendant may testify as a fact witness on his own behalf … so long as those opinions or inferences are rationally based on the witness’s perceptions and helpful to a clear understanding of his or her testimony.”).
Plaintiff did not proffer Dr. Lambert as an expert witness and phrased his question to her in a way that exceeded the scope permissible for her testimony as a treating physician. Defendant objected and this Court properly precluded Plaintiff from eliciting this testimony.
Including Abington Memorial Hospital on the verdict sheet for negligence of its clerical staff, when there was no evidence offered to support the claim, its staff was negligent, would have been erroneous. Testimony was never offered to support the conclusion that the staff was negligent but instead was mentioned in comment of how the office functioned and accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the Superior Court agree with this Court on appeal. In his fourth issue on appeal, Plaintiff alleges that this Court improperly granted Defendants Abington Memorial Hospital, Suzzane Shorten, M.D., Kenneth S. Weiss, D.O., Brent C. Beddis, D.O., and Katie Garrelts, M.D.’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to Alleged Drug Use, filed under control number 23124751.
Dr. Weiss’ speculation of whether Mrs. Outterbridge’s brother used drugs does not amount to an adequate basis in fact that Mrs. Outterbridge’s brother was a drug user. Dr. Weiss stated “I did not know the circumstances of her brother’s death. […] So that was taken into account, but we don’t know the surrounding circumstances, were there drugs involved, was there substance abuse.” Dr. Weiss asserted that he did not know the circumstances of her brother’s death, making any testimony surrounding her brother’s drug use speculative in nature and therefore properly precluded.
absent abuse of discretion, it is the sole responsibility of the trial court to determine the probative value of the offer and ensure it is not outweighed by the risk that its admission will create undue prejudice. Keough v. Republic Fuel and Burner Co., 382 Pa. 593, 116 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1961). During trial, Plaintiff argued that he lost faith in Wyncote Family Hospital after his wife’s passing but Mr. Outterbridge continued treatment there for two years following the filling of this lawsuit. As a testifying party, Mr. Outterbridge’s credibility is in issue, which is critical to the jury’s determination of liability. The fact that Mr. Outterbridge continued treatment with his late wife’s primary care doctor is a clear contradiction of his statement that he lost faith in the practice and has great probative value to his mindset or the veracity of his statement. This Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion in limine was proper, new trial should not be granted on this issue on appeal.
