Austin v. Lehigh & Northampton Transp. Auth., 2024 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 36, 2024 WL 270406 (January 25, 2024) (Jubelirer, P.J.).
Rodney Austin (Austin) appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County’s (trial court) entry of judgment against him. Austin and his wife, Kimberly Moser, sued the Lehigh and Northampton Transportation Authority (LANTA) and Chvon Fenty (Fenty) for injuries Austin suffered after a LANTA bus, operated by Fenty, struck a lift on which Austin was working. LANTA separately sued Austin, Austin’s employer, Ryan Amato Painting, LLC (Amato), and another employee of Amato, Efrain Gonzalez (Gonzalez), for damages to the bus on the basis that traffic warning cones indicating the location of the lift were not properly placed. The trial court consolidated the personal injury and property cases for trial. Austin argues he is entitled to a new trial because under Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, and the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act), the trial court should not have consolidated Austin’s case with LANTA’s case; the trial court should not have allowed LANTA to argue comparative negligence since Amato’s negligence could not be imputed to Austin; and the trial court should have instructed the jury that Amato’s negligence in LANTA’s property case may not be considered or imputed against Austin in his personal injury case. Upon review, we affirm.
The employer’s negligence is relevant and permitted to be presented to show that it was the cause of the employee’s injury, and not the third-party tortfeasor. Dodson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158484, 2017 WL 4284417, at *6; Carcaise, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Neither LANTA nor Austin joined or sought damages from Amato in Austin’s personal injury suit, as such an action would be clearly barred. However, it was permissible for LANTA to present evidence of Amato’s negligence in Austin’s suit to show that LANTA was not the cause of Austin’s injury. Id. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austin’s Motion.
Austin needed to prove the elements of negligence to hold LANTA liable, including causation. As seen from Austin’s verdict slip, the jury found that Austin did not prove LANTA was negligent in the accident, which barred his recovery. Because the jury did not find LANTA negligent, all “evidence bearing on causation” remained relevant, including Amato’s. Dodson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158484, 2017 WL 4284417, at *6; see also Carcaise, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austin’s Motion.
Austin lastly argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by not instructing the jury that Amato’s negligence could not be imputed to Austin.
In Austin’s case, the jury found that Fenty, and therefore LANTA, did not violate any traffic laws or was negligent. As stated above, Austin had the burden to prove that LANTA was negligent in his case. Because the jury found that LANTA was not negligent, Austin was barred from recovery. Therefore, even if the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous, there was no prejudice to Austin because the jury did not find LANTA negligent, barring recovery for Austin, and the jury did not reach the issue of whether Austin was comparatively negligent. See Boyle v. Indep. Lift Truck, Inc., 607 Pa. 311, 6 A.3d 492, 497 (Pa. 2010) (holding “where a jury . . . finds no negligence on the part of a defendant, any issue of comparative negligence no longer remains in the case, and any purported error regarding a question on comparative negligence is non-prejudicial, and does not serve as a basis for a new trial”).
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austin’s Motion. The trial court, in its discretion, consolidated LANTA’s and Austin’s cases. Further, the trial court allowed evidence of Amato’s negligence to be considered in the consolidated cases because it was relevant to whether LANTA was the cause of Austin’s personal injuries. Last, Austin was not prejudiced by the trial court’s jury instructions and, therefore, is not entitled to a new trial. As such, the entry of judgment is affirmed.
