Webb v. DOJ, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24519 (September 27, 2024)(Freeman, J.)
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
William Webb, an inmate at Delaware’s James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC), sued prison officials for failing to schedule court-ordered visits with his daughter. The District Court screened and dismissed the suit, holding that Webb did not exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process or allege a valid constitutional claim. Seeking to appeal, Webb placed a notice of appeal in a mailbox for JTVCC staff to collect and file electronically. We deem his notice filed on the day he placed it in that mailbox, so his appeal is timely. And because the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, we will reverse the District Court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), inmates must “exhaust[]” “such administrative remedies as are available” in the prison system before bringing a lawsuit about prison conditions in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life . . . .” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S. Ct. 983, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2002). As the statute makes clear, prisoners need only exhaust “available” administrative remedies. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635-36, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2016). In this context, “available” means “capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of.” Id. at 642 (cleaned up). A prison’s internal grievance process is not “available” if, for example, (1) “it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” (2) it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use” because “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it,”
In addition, an incarcerated plaintiff generally need not demonstrate that he exhausted his prison’s available grievance procedures in his complaint. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies “is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove,” so the issue is typically resolved later in the litigation process.
Webb’s complaint withstands the screening stage for an additional reason: construed liberally, it states a valid claim for relief. The complaint alleges that “[s]ince October 19, 2020, [Webb] has had court ordered visits to be scheduled” by prison officials, that those visits have “only been performed once” despite that single visit concluding “without incident or intervention,” and that he is in “immediate danger of estrangement” from his daughter as a result. App. 21-22.
Though “inartfully pleaded,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (citation omitted), these allegations support a plausible freedom-of-association claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Constitution “protects an individual’s right to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,” including the parent-child relationship. Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d 416, 431 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Because “freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration,” this right is sharply curtailed in prison. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003). But it is not extinguished altogether. Id. (“We do not hold, and we do not imply, that any right to intimate association is altogether terminated by incarceration . . . .”); see also Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding a ban on contact visits but observing that the policy did “not preclude[] [a prisoner] from visiting with members of his family and others”). Indeed, “while the [Supreme] Court has sustained significant abridgments of prisoners’ associational rights, . . . [those] sustained policies have often contained exceptions expressly privileging prisoners’ communications with immediate family members.”
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the District Court’s order dismissing Webb’s complaint and remand the case for further proceedings.
