Wolfe v. Avena (In re Avena), 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2670, 2024 WL 442071 (3d Cir. February 6, 2024) (Porter, C.J.).
Adrian Avena and Aaron Greenberg were fishing off the coast of New Jersey when their boat partially capsized. Tragically, Greenberg drowned before the U.S. Coast Guard or others arrived to their rescue. Greenberg’s estate (Estate), Avena, and AA Commercial, LLC, assert maritime tort claims against the United States. They allege that the Coast Guard acted negligently in carrying out a search-and-rescue mission, and they assert that the government has waived its sovereign immunity under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA). The District Court found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the United States was immune from suit, and it dismissed the case with prejudice. We will affirm.
Through the SAA, Congress waived the government’s sovereign immunity for “civil action[s] in admiralty” so long as the action “could be maintained” against a “private person” in like circumstances. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a). The SAA itself does not “create [a] cause[] of action against the United States.” O’Connell v. Interocean Mgmt. Corp., 90 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). Instead, “a plaintiff must show that the United States would be liable under maritime tort law.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2003). “In the arena of tort law, general maritime law mirrors many principles of traditional negligence law.” Turner v. United States, 736 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2013). So when plaintiffs allege, as here, that the Coast Guard acted negligently, they must plead that it had an identifiable duty to act, breached that duty, and that the breach proximately harmed them. See id.; see also Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 1982).
The Coast Guard does not have an affirmative duty to undertake any rescue operations. See 14 U.S.C. § 521 (authorizing the Coast Guard to conduct rescue operations, but not imposing any affirmative duty to do so). But “once the Coast Guard undertakes a rescue operation, it must act with reasonable care.” Sagan, 342 F.3d at 498 (citing Patentas). “Its actions are judged according to the so-called ‘Good Samaritan’ doctrine.” Id. Under that doctrine, the Coast Guard will be liable for any failure to exercise reasonable care if it “increase[d] the risk of [physical] harm” or “[physical] harm [was] suffered because of [the person in need of rescue’s] reliance upon the undertaking.” Patentas, 687 F.2d at 714 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Plaintiffs rely solely on the “increased the risk of physical harm” theory of liability.
Therefore, on a motion to dismiss, the District Court erred in ruling that the Coast Guard did not have a duty to act reasonably before its alleged breach. On the United States’ Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenge, we must construe the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and ask whether it was plausible that the Coast Guard had a duty to act reasonably before it breached.
Although the Plaintiffs plausibly plead that the Coast Guard had a duty to act reasonably before its alleged breaches, Plaintiffs fail to properly plead how the Coast Guard’s failure to exercise reasonable care “increase[d] the risk of [physical] harm” to Greenberg. Patentas, 687 F.2d at 714 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). To meet this standard, Plaintiffs must show how “[t]he risk [wa]s increased over what it would have been had the defendant not engaged in the undertaking at all”—not “over what it would have been if the defendant had not been negligent.” Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 261 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
Had the Coast Guard not engaged in the undertaking at all, no helicopter or other assets would have arrived on the scene.
Thus, for either breach, the Coast Guard did not “increase the risk of physical harm” under the Good Samaritan doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiffs could not sustain an action against a private person in like circumstances. So Plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the SAA, and the United States is immune from suit.
The District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the United States is immune from suit. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the case against the United States with prejudice.
