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Gittelmacher v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53130 (E.D. Pa. March 27, 2023) (Pratter, J.), appeal filed (Apr. 25, 2023) (No.23-1774). Ms. Gittelmacher was struck by an automobile while she was walking through a parking lot in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. Because of the accident, Ms. Gittelmacher sustained injuries including a tibial plateau fracture, which required surgery. The driver• of the vehicle had insurance with a per person bodily injury liability limit of $15,000, which was paid out to Ms. Gittelmacher. Both Ms. Gittelmacher’s policy and the Lyons Depositors Policy contain an “Other Insurance” clause. Gittelmacher made a claim for underinsured motorist coverage benefits under all three policies in her household, demanding $250,000. Depositors paid out only $100,000 after considering the “Other Insurance” language in Ms. Gittelmacher’s policy. Travelers paid Depositors $20,000; its pro rata share of the amount the insurance company believed to be recoverable by Ms. Gittelmacher. The insurance companies argued that Ms. Gittelmacher is not permitted to recover from the Lyons Depositors Policy as a matter of law because (1) Ms. Gittelmacher, her daughter, and her granddaughter knowingly waived interpolicy stacking; (2) the “Other Insurance” clause limits Ms. Gittelmacher’s maximum recovery to the highest applicable limit for any one vehicle under any one policy (i.e., the $100,000 already paid to Ms. Gittelmacher from her own policy); and (3) there is no legal basis for the Court to invalidate the “Other Insurance” clause because it does not violate the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, Pa, Cons, Stat §§ 1701-99.7 (the “MVFRL”) or any other clearly expressed public policy of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that interpolicy stacking may be waived under § 1738, but only if the waiver is “knowing.” Craley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 586 Pa. 482, 895 A.2d 530, 540-41 (Pa. 2006). In Craley, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the § 1738(d) waiver language by its actual terms refers only to intrapolicy, not interpolicy, stacking, because the language refers to a waiver of benefits under a singular policy, rather than a waiver of benefits under multiple policies. Craley, 895 A.2d at 541-42; accord Backmeier, 287 A.3d at 940. That means that the statutory waiver does not by itself establish a valid waiver of interpolicy stacking. Craley, 895 A.2d at 541-42. But, as the Craley court reasoned, where the policy tied to the stacking waiver covers only one vehicle, intrapolicy stacking is not possible. Id. at 542. As a result, the policyholder with a single vehicle under the insurance policy has only one reasonable interpretation of the waiver available—that it is a waiver of interpolicy stacking—and therefore, “the waiver is valid and enforceable under the facts of th[e] case.” Id. The rationale in Craley applies here because the relevant facts are not distinguishable. Like the policy at issue in Crate)), Ms. Gittelmacher’s policy, the Lyons Depositors Policy, and the Lyons Travelers Policy cover just one vehicle each, and the policyholders for all policies signed statutory waiver forms prior to the date of the accident When Ms. Gittelmacher and her resident relatives received premium reductions following execution of those waivers, they were “presumed to have known that the waiver applied to inter-policy stacking, notwithstanding [the] contention that [they] did not understand what [they] were signing.” Additionally, limiting Ms. Gittelmacher’s recovery under these facts, where all three named insureds waived stacking, means that this Court will not run afoul of the old insurance industry rule that “an injured should receive the coverage for which [s]he has paid.” Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 138. In sum, there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and Ms. Gittelmacher cannot overcome the clear and unambiguous terms of the stacked benefits waiver she signed, which conform with the requirements of Pennsylvania’s MVFRL and do not violate public policy. The Court granted summary judgment to Depositors and Travelers.