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Golik v. Erie Ins. Exch., 2023 Pa. Super. LEXIS 356 (August 7, 2023) (Murray, J.) Erie Insurance Exchange (Appellant) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Valerie Golik (Mrs. Golik) in this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the judgment in favor of Mrs. Golik, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Appellant. Our courts have long held that third parties, drivers and named insureds are bound by the decisions of the first named insured. A named insured, even when subsequently added to a policy, is presumed to have known about available options and is bound by the first named insured’s election of lesser coverage, unless the insured takes an affirmative step to change the coverage. See Rupert I, 718 A.2d at 135-36; General Acc. Ins. Co., 445 Pa. Super. at 304-05; Kimball, 660 A.2d at 1388-89. See also Rupert II, 291 F.3d at 247-48; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d at 640-42. Here, Mr. Golick purchased the Policy in 1992, and executed a stacking waiver in 1998. Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2 (unnumbered). The parties married in 2000 and added Mrs. Golick to the Policy in 2001; Mr. Golick executed a second stacking waiver in 2004. Id. The Golicks continued to pay reduced premiums for unstacked UM/UIM insurance. N.T., 3/1/22, at 31-32, 51. Mr. Golick, the first named insured, affirmed his execution of the stacking waiver. Id. at 40. He admitted his annual policy declaration sheets changed his coverage status from stacked to unstacked after he signed the waiver. Id. at 41-51. Mr. Golick claimed he did not understand what he was signing. Id. However, he acknowledged he never asked for assistance or clarification, but signed and returned the forms. Id. at 51. Mrs. Golick testified that she was aware Appellant provided UM/UIM coverage and she and Mr. Golick were current on their premiums at the time of the accident. Mrs. Golick stated she never signed or heard about the stacking waivers. The record reflects the Golicks enjoyed the benefit of reduced premiums for more than 20 years. The record also confirms that despite claiming he did not understand the waiver, Mr. Golick signed it in 1998, and again in 2004, without asking for any explanation or assistance. During the subsequent 18 years when Mrs. Golick was insured under the joint policy, she took no affirmative steps to request a change to the policy to stack the insurance or obtain a separate policy. Consistent with the evidence and foregoing case law, we conclude that Mrs. Golick had constructive knowledge of the stacking waiver and is bound by the signature of the first named insured, Mr. Golick, on the stacking waiver. Even if we were not persuaded by the above case law, we would not find Section 1738 of the MVFRL ambiguous. The trial court acknowledged that the plain language of subsections 1738(d) and (e) only required the signature of the first named insured for a valid stacking waiver. For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the judgment entered in favor of Mrs. Golick and remand to the trial court for the entry of judgment in favor of Appellant.