Trump v. United States, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2886 (S. Ct. June 28, 2024) (Thomas, J.)
Donald J. Trump v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States decided July 1, 2024.
This case involves a criminal inditement against presidency for conspiracy to defraud The United States, conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, obstruction of an attempt to obstruct an official proceeding against rights in violation of Section 241. The question raised is to what extent does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official during his tenure in office. This is the first criminal prosecution in history in nation of a former president to have actually taken place during his presidency.
A former president can be subject to criminal prosecution for unofficial acts committed while in office. Some of the conduct described in the indictment includes actions taken by Trump in his unofficial capacity.
We conclude that under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is also entitled to immunity. At the current stage of proceedings in this case, however, we need not and do not decide whether that immunity must be absolute, or instead whether a presumptive immunity is sufficient.
Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions on subjects within his “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not criminalize the President’s actions within his exclusive constitutional power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. We thus conclude that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.
…we conclude that the separation of powers principles explicated in our precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within the outer perimeter of his official responsibility. Such an immunity is required to safeguard the independence and effective functioning of the Executive Branch, and to enable the President to carry out his constitutional duties without undue caution. Indeed, if presumptive protection for the President is necessary to enable the “effective discharge” of his powers when a prosecutor merely seeks evidence of his official papers and communications, id., at 711, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, it is certainly necessary when the prosecutor seeks to charge, try, and imprison the President himself for his official actions. At a minimum, the President must therefore be immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349.
As for a President’s unofficial acts, there is no immunity. The principles we set out in Clinton v. Jones confirm as much. When Paula Jones brought a civil lawsuit against then-President Bill Clinton for acts he allegedly committed prior to his Presidency, we rejected his argument that he enjoyed temporary immunity from the lawsuit while serving as President. 520 U. S., at 684, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 137 L. Ed. 2d 945. Although Presidential immunity is required for official actions to ensure that the President’s decision making is not distorted by the threat of future litigation stemming from those actions, that concern does not support immunity for unofficial conduct. Id., at 694, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 137 L. Ed. 2d 945, and n. 19. The “‘justifying purposes’” of the immunity we recognized in Fitzgerald, and the one we recognize today, are not that the President must be immune because he is the President; rather, they are to ensure that the President can undertake his constitutionally designated functions effectively, free from undue pressures or distortions.
In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II interests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, “[i]t would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government” if “[i]n exercising the functions of his office,” the President was “under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498, 16 S. Ct. 631, 40 L. Ed. 780 (1896)). We thus rejected such inquiries in Fitzgerald. The plaintiff there contended that he was dismissed from the Air Force for retaliatory reasons. See 457 U. S., at 733-741, 756, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349. The Air Force responded that the reorganization that led to Fitzgerald’s dismissal was undertaken to promote efficiency. Ibid. Because under Fitzgerald’s theory “an inquiry into the President’s motives could not be avoided,” we rejected the theory, observing that “[i]nquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.” Id., at 756, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349. “[B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 817-818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. For instance, when Fitzgerald contended that his dismissal violated various congressional statutes and thus rendered his discharge “outside the outer perimeter of [Nixon’s] duties,” we rejected that contention. 457 U. S., at 756, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349. Otherwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect. Ibid.
Trump is therefore absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials. He has the right to hire or fire those people at will.
The indictment’s allegation that Trump attempted to pressure the Vice President with a particular act in connection with his role at the certification proceedings thus involved official conduct, and Trump is at least presumptively immune for being prosecuted for such conduct.
The question is whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. We remand to The District Court to assess in the first instance whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice Presidents oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as president would pose. Any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. We also remand to The District Court to determine the first instance whether Trump’s conduct in dealing with people outside The White House about the votes qualifies as official or unofficial.
Likewise, with respect to Tweets on January 6th, the matters remain to The District Court to determine in the first instance whether the alleged conduct is official or unofficial.
If official conduct for which a president is immune may be scrutinized to help secure its conviction, even n charges that report to be based only on his unofficial conduct, the “intended effect” of immunity would be defeated. The president’s immune conduct would be subject to examination by a jury on the basis of generally applicable criminal laws. Use of evidence about such conduct even when an indictment alleges only unofficial conduct, would thereby heighten the prospect that the president’s official decision making will be distorted.
The President enjoys no immunity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is official. The President is not above the law. But Congress may not criminalize the President’s conduct in carrying out the responsibilities of the Executive Branch under the Constitution. And the system of separated powers designed by the Framers has always demanded an energetic, independent Executive. The President therefore may not be prosecuted for exercising his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled, at a minimum, to a presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. That immunity applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Office, regardless of politics, policy, or party.
