King v. Driscoll, 2023 Pa. Super. LEXIS 581 (December 7, 2023) (Stabile, J.).
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
OPINION BY STABILE, J.
Christopher P. Driscoll (Driscoll) appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) granting the petition to enforce settlement filed by Driscoll’s former business partner, John G. King (King). According to Driscoll, the settlement agreement was not binding because it had been sent by his attorney to King without Driscoll’s prior authorization. In our initial review of the settlement order, this Court remanded the case back to the trial court for additional findings as to whether Driscoll in fact authorized his attorney to send the proposed agreement to King. The trial court entered new findings in response, determining that Driscoll’s attorney indeed had such authority. As the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, we affirm.
In the present case, the parties’ dispute concerns whether Driscoll had approved a draft of a settlement agreement sent to and accepted by King on May 20, 2021. Although Driscoll had not signed a final version of the document, King contends that it was nevertheless a binding contract because Driscoll had agreed to all the material terms conveyed by his attorney.
The materiality of the RRF application is critical to our disposition because it settles the issue of whether Driscoll’s attorney (Conlon) had express authority to settle the case. Since Driscoll admits that he had agreed to all the terms that Conlon ultimately conveyed to King on May 20, 2021, it follows that if the disclosure of the RRF application was not a material term at that time, then its omission would be irrelevant, and the negotiation concluded once King accepted that version of the agreement on the same date.
While there is conflicting evidence as to whether Driscoll had directed King to make receipt of the RRF application a settlement condition, it was for the trial court to resolve that conflict, and this Court is bound by the trial court’s finding of fact in that regard. See Salsman, 51 A.3d at 893-94. Driscoll’s attempt to prove the import of the RRF application through his own statements and those of his attorney, was rejected by the trial court as a credibility determination that we find is supported by the record and now is binding on this Court. See Lewis, 234 A.3d at 711. As such, we discern no reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusion that the attorneys for King and Driscoll negotiated a binding settlement agreement and that the disclosure of the RRF application was immaterial prior to the conclusion of their negotiations.
Order affirmed.
