Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court. Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach because he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet prayer of thanks. Mr. Kennedy prayed during a period when school employees were free to speak with a friend, call for a reservation at a restaurant, check email, or attend to other personal matters. He offered his prayers quietly while his students were otherwise occupied. Still, the Bremerton School District disciplined him anyway. It did so because it thought anything less could lead a reasonable observer to conclude (mistakenly) that it endorsed Mr. Kennedy’s religious beliefs. That reasoning was misguided. Both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect expressions like Mr. Kennedy’s. Nor does a proper understanding of the Amendment’s Establishment Clause require the government to single out private religious speech for special disfavor. The Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views alike. Now before us, Mr. Kennedy renews his argument that the District’s conduct violated both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. These Clauses work in tandem. Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, whether communicative or not, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 269, 70 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1981); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 841, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995). That the First Amendment doubly protects religious speech is no accident. It is a natural outgrowth of the framers’ distrust of government attempts to regulate religion and suppress dissent. See, e.g., A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Selected Writings of James Madison 21, 25 (R. Ketcham ed. 2006). “[I]n Anglo-American history, . . . government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.” Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 760, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 132 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995). Under this Court’s precedents, a plaintiff bears certain burdens to demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries these burdens, the focus then shifts to the defendant to show that its actions were nonetheless justified and tailored consistent with the demands of our case law. See, e.g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___-___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2021) (slip op., at 4-5, 13); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). We begin by examining whether Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens, first under the Free Exercise Clause, then under the Free Speech Clause. The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Amdt. 1. This Court has held the Clause applicable to the States under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). The Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs inwardly and secretly. It does perhaps its most important work by protecting the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through “the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990). Under this Court’s precedents, a plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” Id., at 879-881, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876. Should a plaintiff make a showing like that, this Court will find a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy “strict scrutiny” by demonstrating its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472. It seems clear to us that Mr. Kennedy has demonstrated that his speech was private speech, not government speech. When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as a coach. Lane, 573 U. S., at 240, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. He did not speak pursuant to government policy. He was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. See Part I-B, supra. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy’s prayers did not “ow[e their] existence” to Mr. Kennedy’s responsibilities as a public employee. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least “strict scrutiny,” showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff ’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472; n. 1, supra. A similar standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See Reed, 576 U. S., at 171, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236. It is true that this Court and others often refer to the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free Exercise Clause,” and the “Free Speech Clause” as separate units. But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.” Amdt. 1. A natural reading of that sentence would seem to suggest the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947). Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic—whether those expressions take place in a sanctuary or on a field, and whether they manifest through the spoken word or a bowed head. Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for engaging in a brief, quiet, personal religious observance doubly protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. And the only meaningful justification the government offered for its reprisal rested on a mistaken view that it had a duty to ferret out and suppress religious observances even as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is entitled to summary judgment on his First Amendment claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan join, dissenting:
Today’s decision goes beyond merely misreading the record. The Court overrules Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971), and calls into question decades of subsequent precedents that it deems “offshoot[s]” of that decision. Ante, at 22. In the process, the Court rejects longstanding concerns surrounding government endorsement of religion and replaces the standard for reviewing such questions with a new “history and tradition” test. In addition, while the Court reaffirms that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from coercing participation in religious exercise, it applies a nearly toothless version of the coercion analysis, failing to acknowledge the unique pressures faced by students when participating in school-sponsored activities. This decision does a disservice to schools and the young citizens they serve, as well as to our Nation’s longstanding commitment to the separation of church and state. I respectfully dissent.
