Office of Disp. Counsel v. Anonymous Atty. 2024 Pa. LEXIS 1834 (Pa. Super., October 24, 2024)(Donohoe)
We begin with the first sentence of Rule 1.5(a): “[a] lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.” Pa.R.P.C. 1.5(a). When interpreting statutory language, we do so “not in isolation, but with reference to the context in which it appears[,]” and we extend the same rationale to interpreting our own rules. Commonwealth v. Kingston, 636 Pa. 438, 143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016); see also In re Lackawanna Cnty., 654 Pa. 1, 212 A.3d 1, 6-7 (Pa. 2019) (“[T]o the extent we must engage in statutory interpretation of our own procedural rules, we apply conventional interpretative principles.”). The context for Rule 1.5 is established by its placement in Chapter One of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs the “client lawyer relationship.” The first sentence of the Rule sets the general prohibition against excessive fees. The remainder of Rule 1.5(a) lists eight factors “to be considered in determining the propriety of a fee … [,]” three of which specifically refer to “the client.” Pa.R.P.C. 1.5(a)(3), (6), (7). We must consider all of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5(a). The plain language of Rule 1.5(a) makes clear that its aim is to protect clients from being charged clearly excessive fees.
Rule 1.5(a) serves an important role in ensuring that attorneys do not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee from their clients. Based on the language of the rule and its placement within the Rules of Professional Conduct, we hold that Rule 1.5(a) does not apply where an attorney files a fee petition seeking to recover fees on behalf of his client from an adverse party.
Based on our interpretation of Rule 8.4(d) in the context of the entirety of Rule 8.4 and our review of our case law interpreting it, as well as the arguments of the parties, we conclude that under the facts presented, there is no violation of Rule 8.4(d). Rule 8.4. provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;12 (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, except that a lawyer may advise, direct, or supervise others, including clients, law enforcement officers, and investigators, who participate in lawful investigative activities; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or (g) in the practice of law, knowingly engage in conduct constituting harassment or discrimination based upon race, sex, gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.
The trial court was not prevented from adjudicating the fee petition and determining whether the fees should be awarded. Even more importantly, Respondent was not charged with any violation of the Rules prohibiting deceit, fraud or misrepresentation. There was no indication that he sought to mislead the federal district court in the fee petition proceeding. Although the fee petition may have required the trial court to “expend considerable time and judicial resources,” see ODC’s Brief at 59, this does not rise to the level of interference with or thwarting the administration of justice. Although tedious, justice was administered.
