Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging, LLC, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22392 (U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 3d Cir., September 4, 2024) (McKee, J.)
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Andrew Morgan appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Allison Crane & Rigging LLC. Morgan had sued alleging that Allison Crane terminated his employment because of a lower back injury that prevented Morgan from doing anything more than “light duty” alternative work. He claimed disability-based discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) (Counts I and II), and wrongful discharge in violation of Pennsylvania common law (Count III).
We will vacate in part, reverse in part, and affirm in part. We reverse because the District Court applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to Morgan’s back pain-based discrimination claims, and we vacate because the District Court failed entirely to consider Morgan’s statutory retaliation and failure to accommodate claims. We write precedentially to clarify that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) expanded the scope of disability coverage under the ADA. We also clarify that our decision in Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC applied a pre-ADAAA standard to allegations that arose before the ADAAA was enacted. Accordingly, that decision should not control adjudications of claims that arose after the effective date of the ADAAA.
To prove disability discrimination, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (i) they have a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (ii) they are “otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer[;]” and (iii) they have “suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Plaintiffs are disabled within the meaning of the ADA if they: (1) have “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more” of their “major life activities”; (2) have “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) are “regarded as having such an impairment.”
Morgan also argues that the District Court erred when it dismissed his claim that he was unlawfully discriminated against because of an actual herniated or bulged disc disability. The District Court rejected this claim because (i) Morgan’s only evidence of a herniated or bulged disc diagnosis was his own testimony that his chiropractor had so diagnosed him, and that constituted inadmissible hearsay; and (ii) medical evidence is required to prove that he had a bulged or herniated disc. Because we agree that Morgan needed medical evidence to substantiate that he suffered from a bulged or herniated disc, we will affirm the District Court’s order insofar as it dismissed this claim.
Medical testimony is not always required to establish a disability. “[T]he necessity of medical testimony turns on the extent to which the alleged impairment is within the comprehension of a jury that does not possess a command of medical or otherwise scientific knowledge.” This assessment is also to “be made on a case-by-case basis.” Generally, ailments that “are the least technical in nature and are the most amenable to comprehension by a lay jury” need not be established by medical evidence. We have previously explained that arm and neck pain are among those ailments which do not require medical evidence. The District Court correctly concluded that a herniated disk is a spinal injury that is “not within the comprehension of a jury that does not possess a command of medical or otherwise scientific knowledge. Morgan’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Accordingly we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of that claim.
We are left with the District Court’s dismissal of Morgan’s retaliation and failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and PHRA and his wrongful termination claim under Pennsylvania common law.
The District Court failed to offer any justification for dismissing Morgan’s retaliation and failure to accommodate claims. Ironically, Allison Crane did not even move for dismissal of the retaliation claims, and the District Court did not purport to dismiss the retaliation claims sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2).
We are therefore at a loss to understand why the court dismissed those claims. Accordingly, we will vacate the order dismissing the retaliation and failure to accommodate claims and remand so that those claims can be addressed. On remand the District Court should also consider whether Allison Crane has failed to preserve its arguments against the retaliation claims.
Finally, we will affirm dismissal of Morgan’s wrongful termination claim under Pennsylvania common law because there is no evidence that he filed for or suggested to anyone at Allison Crane that he intended to file for workers’ compensation. We note, however, that in an appropriate case, evidence that an employer took sufficient steps to dissuade an employee from filing for workers’ compensation.
we will vacate the order dismissing the retaliation and failure to accommodate claims and remand so that those claims can be addressed. On remand the District Court should also consider whether Allison Crane has failed to preserve its arguments against the retaliation claims.
Finally, we will affirm dismissal of Morgan’s wrongful termination claim under Pennsylvania common law because there is no evidence that he filed for or suggested to anyone at Allison Crane that he intended to file for workers’ compensation. We note, however, that in an appropriate case, evidence that an employer took sufficient steps to dissuade an employee from filing for workers’ compensation may support relief. Given this record, we leave for another day the determination of the nature of any such relief.
For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the District Court’s order in part, reverse it in part, affirm it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
