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Calcutt v. FDIC, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2063, 2023 WL 3571460 (S. Ct. May 22, 2023). PER CURIAM. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought an enforcement action against petitioner, the former CEO of a Michigan-based community bank, for mismanaging one of the bank’s loan relationships in the wake of the “Great Recession” of 2007-2009. After proceedings before the agency concluded, the FDIC ordered petitioner removed from office, prohibited him from further banking activities, and assessed $125,000 in civil penalties. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That court determined that the FDIC had made two legal errors in adjudicating petitioner’s case. But instead of remanding the matter back to the agency, the Sixth Circuit conducted its own review of the record and concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s decision. It is a well-established maxim of administrative law that “[i]f the record before the agency does not support the agency action, [or] if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, . . . the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744, 105 S. Ct. 1598, 84 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1985). A “reviewing court,” accordingly, “is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.” Ibid. For if the grounds propounded by the agency for its decision “are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.” Chenery, 332 U. S., at 196, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995; see also Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 204 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2019) (slip op., at 15) (“Fundamental principles of administrative law . . . teach that a federal court generally goes astray if it decides a question that has been delegated to an agency if that agency has not first had a chance to address the question”). The Sixth Circuit, for its part, believed that remand was unnecessary because it “would result in yet another agency proceeding that amounts to ‘an idle and useless formality.’” 37 F. 4th, at 335 (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, 766, n. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1426, 22 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1969) (plurality opinion)). It is true that remand may be unwarranted in cases where “[t]here is not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome” of the agency’s proceedings on remand. Id., at 767, n. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1426, 22 L. Ed. 2d 709. But we have applied that exception only in narrow circumstances. Where the agency “was required” to take a particular action, we have observed, “[t]hat it provided a different rationale for the necessary result is no cause for upsetting its ruling.” Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U. S. 527, 544-545, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 171 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2008). The petition for writ of certiorari is granted limited to the first question presented. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.