WRONGFUL DISCHARGE – WHISTLEBLOWER – MCARE ACT – CONTRACT – EMPLOYMENT

Brader v. Allegheny Health Network, 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 555 (December 2, 2025) Bender, P.J.E.
Judges: BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.
Opinion by: BENDER
Appellants, Allegheny Health Network (“AHN”) and AHN Medical Group (“Medical Group”), appeal from the trial court’s May 20, 2024, order denying their motion for summary judgment against Appellee, Eric Brader, M.D. Upon review, we reverse.
Count I claimed that Appellants violated the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (“MCARE Act”), 40 P.S. § 1303.101 et seq., by discharging him from his role as EMS Medical Director, Director of Emergency Ultrasound, Associate Fellowship Director, and Core Faculty in retaliation for the report he made. Count II included a claim for common law wrongful discharge, asserting that his discharge contravenes the public policy of Pennsylvania as set forth in the MCARE Act.
Here, Dr. Brader alleged that he made a good faith report to Appellants of a serious event at the hospital in November 2014, and Appellants discharged Dr. Brader from his position as the EMS Medical Director, Director of Emergency Ultrasound, Associate Fellowship Director, and Core Faculty in retaliation for the report in September 2015, in violation of the MCARE Act. Appellants, however, argue that this claim is time-barred under Section 1303.308(c), as Dr. Brader did not initiate this action until September 2017.
Section 1303.308(c) of the MCARE Act says that a health care worker who reports the occurrence of a serious event or incident in accordance with the statute “shall not be subject to any retaliatory action for reporting the serious event or incident and shall have the protections and remedies set forth in … the Whistleblower Law.” 40 P.S. § 1303.308(c). Thus, the plain language of Section 1303.308(c) incorporates the protections and remedies of the Whistleblower Law.15 In turn, Section 1424 of the Whistleblower Law, which is entitled “Remedies[,]” provides in Subsection (a) that “[a] person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation.” 43 P.S. § 1424(a). Thus, the plain language of Section 1424(a) affords a complainant the remedy of bringing a civil action within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation. Reading the plain language of these two statutes together, it is clear and unambiguous to us that the General Assembly intended for the 180-day limitation to apply to retaliation claims made pursuant to Section 1303.308. A contrary reading would require us to avoid giving effect to all of the language in Section 1424(a). See Ursinus College, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that retaliation claims under the MCARE Act have the same 180-day statute of limitations as claims under the Whistleblower Law.
Having determined that the 180-day limitation period applies to retaliation claims under the MCARE Act, we consider the timing of the filing of Dr. Brader’s action. He submits that he was retaliated against in September 2015, when he was notified that he would no longer serve in certain administrative roles and that his stipend was being eliminated. Yet, Dr. Brader did not file a praecipe for writ of summons, commencing this action against Appellants, until September 15, 2017. Unquestionably, his retaliation claim under the MCARE Act is time-barred, as it was filed more than 180 days after the purported retaliatory action. Further, because Judge McVay’s ruling to the contrary was clearly erroneous, and it would be manifestly unjust to let Dr. Brader’s MCARE Act claim proceed where it was untimely filed, we also conclude that Judge Wagner was not bound by the coordinate jurisdiction rule to follow Judge McVay’s earlier decision. We conclude that Judge Wagner erred in denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Dr. Brader’s MCARE Act claim in Count I, and we reverse that part of her order.
In Appellants’ second issue, they assert that the MCARE Act preempts Dr. Brader’s common law wrongful discharge claim. “In Pennsylvania, absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, either party may terminate an employment relationship for any or no reason.” Weaver v. Harpster, 601 Pa. 488, 975 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). Generally, “there is no common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an at-will employment relationship. Exceptions to this rule have been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of atwill employees would threaten clear mandates of public policy.” Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989) (cleaned up). Here, in asserting his common law wrongful discharge claim, Dr. Brader alleged that he was discharged for reporting the dangers created by Appellants’ hospital policy, and that his discharge contravenes the public policy of Pennsylvania as set forth in the MCARE Act.
The PHRA provides that it is an unlawful practice for any employer to discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against an employee on the basis of sex. 43 P.S. § 955(a). A right to a remedy for discrimination in employment is established by the PHRA, 43 P.S. § 953, where it is provided, “The opportunity for an individual to obtain employment for which he is qualified … without discrimination because of … sex … is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right which shall be enforceable as set forth in this act.” ([e]mphasis added). Thus, the PHRA both bestows a right to be free from discrimination based on sex and prescribes procedures whereby the right “shall” be vindicated. The use by the legislature of the word “shall,” as opposed to “may,” expresses an intent to make administrative procedures under the PHRA a mandatory rather than discretionary means of enforcing the right created thereby. Clearly, too, the right in question is of purely statutory origin, for … common law rights to be free from termination of at-will employment are not generally recognized, and we have never held that at-will employment terminations arising from sex discrimination are actionable at common law. In short, the remedy that should have been invoked by [the employees] was the one provided by the PHRA.
Allowing a discharged employee to commence an action in the courts without first exhausting administrative remedies would be logically inconsistent with the legislature’s having created the PHRC to function as an efficient mechanism for handling such disputes.
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the availability of a statutory remedy under the MCARE Act precludes Dr. Brader’s common law wrongful discharge claim based on the MCARE Act. While Clay involved the PHRA, which we acknowledge differs from the MCARE Act and Whistleblower Law in that it has mandatory administrative remedies, we nevertheless find it instructive. In Clay, the Court observed that the right in question was of “purely statutory origin[,]” the remedy that should have been invoked by the employees was the one provided by the statute, and that it would be “logically inconsistent” to allow the employees in that case to commence an action in the courts without first exhausting the administrative remedies created by the legislature. Clay, 559 A.2d at 919. Similarly, here, the right in question derives from the MCARE Act, and the remedy Dr. Brader invoked should have been the one provided to him by the legislature in the MCARE Act. It also would be logically inconsistent to allow Dr. Brader to bring a common law wrongful discharge claim based on the MCARE Act where his statutory claim under the MCARE Act is untimely.
Accordingly, because the MCARE Act affords a statutory remedy to Dr. Brader, we determine that the MCARE Act preempts his common law wrongful discharge claim based solely on the MCARE Act. We therefore conclude that Judge Wagner erred in denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Dr. Brader’s common law wrongful discharge claim in Count II, as Judge McVay’s earlier ruling was clearly erroneous, and it would be manifestly unjust to allow Dr. Brader’s common law wrongful discharge claim to advance. See Ivy Hill, supra. Appellants are entitled to summary judgment. Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
• Since the Mcare Act affords a statutory remedy for Dr. Brader, the Superior Court determined that the Mcare Act preempts is common law wrongful discharge claim based solely on the Mcare Act.
• Judge Wagner below erred in denying Appellants motion of summary judgment with respect to Dr. Brader’s common law wrongful discharge claim. Since Judge McVay’s earlier ruling was clearly erroneous.
• It would be manifestly unjust to allow Dr. Brader common law wrongful discharge claim to advance.
• The lawsuit claiming Count I that the doctor was discharged from his role as EMS Medical Director, Director of Emergency UltraSound, Associate Fellowship Director, and core facility in retaliation for a report that he made about the care rendered and how the system works in terms of getting patients emergency treatment.
• Count II included a claim for common law wrongful discharge asserting that the discharge contravenes the public policy of Pennsylvania as set forth in the Mcare Act.
• Section 1303.308 (c) of the Mcare Act says that a healthcare worker that reports the occurrence of a serious event or incident in accordance with the statute shall not subject to any retaliatory action for reporting the serious event or incident and as a protection set forth in the Whistleblower Law.
• The Mcare Act incorporates the protections and remedies of the Whistleblower Law.
• Complainant must bring civil action within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation under the Whistleblower Law and that would apply under the Mcare Act as well.
• Claims under the Mcare Act have the same 180 days statute of limitations, as claimed under the Whistleblower Law.
• Thus, Judge Wagner erred in denying the appellants motion of summary judgment with respect to Dr. Brader’s Mcare Act in Count I.
• On the second issue, there is no separate common law action under the Mcare Act.