John v. Demis, 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 379 (August 18, 2025) Sullivan, J.
Judges: BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J. OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.
John V. Healy and Amy Rohan Demis (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of T.A.G. Builders, Inc. (“T.A.G.”); Greenstone Development II Corporation a/k/a Greenstone Development II Corp. (“Greenstone”); and additional defendants Riehl Brothers Construction, LLC. (“Riehl Bros.”) and Supplee Construction, LLC (“Supplee”) Page 2 of 16 (collectively, “Appellees”). In this action, Appellants initially brought design and construction defect claims against Appellees for a home the Appellants took possession of in October 2011. After Appellees’ initial summary judgment motion (“the initial summary judgment motion”) was denied, a subsequent summary judgment motion (“the second summary judgment motion”) was filed. Both summary judgment motions dealt with the same issue, whether the statute of repose for construction projects pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536 was triggered by an untitled 2006 document from Westtown township (“2006 document”) or a 2011 document presented by the Appellants entitled “Certificate of Occupancy Re-sale” (“2011 document”). The respective parties argued that their respective documents were “Certificates of Occupancy” which started the clock on the statute of repose. The trial court granted the second summary judgment motion in favor of Appellees. The issue before us is whether, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the trial court erred in concluding that the 2006 document produced by Appellees was a certificate of occupancy that triggered the statute of repose.
Following our review, we conclude that based on the applicable summary judgment standard, the trial court failed to view the record, including the 2006 document, testimony by Westtown Township Manager Jon Altschul (“Mr. Altschul”), and expert testimony, in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, i.e., Appellants. The issue of the contested certificates of occupancy are an issue of material fact that the trier of fact should determine. Consequently, we reverse.
Given that it was Greenstone’s burden to prove the applicability of the statute of repose, and in light of the conflicting evidence in the record, the trial court erred in concluding the statute of repose applied to Greenstone, without specifying evidence in the record of activities Greenstone performed which brought it within the scope of the statute of repose, and by, instead, disregarding this evidence and relying on a mere averment in Appellants’ pleading (i.e., the complaint) and an admission in their answer in opposition to summary judgment that Greenstone was a developer. Rather, this dispute of material fact must be resolved by a fact finder and not addressed as a matter of law via summary judgment. See McConnaughey, 637 A.2d at 1333; Petrina, 46 A.3d at 798 (providing that a court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party). For these additional reasons, the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary judgment.
