Weatherholtz v. McKelvey, 2025 Pa. LEXIS 1978 (December 16, 2025) Donohue, J.
JUSTICE DONOHUE
The Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 62A01-62A20 (“the Act”), permits victims of sexual violence or intimidation to seek an order protecting them from the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. In this case we are asked to determine when the six year statute of limitations applicable to such petitions for protective orders begins to run. Consistent with our ordinary principles governing statutes of limitations, we hold that the limitation [*2] period begins to run from the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrates that a plaintiff, or appropriate individual, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant, as this is the moment an action accrues. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for further proceedings.
Because a victim is able prove a continued risk of harm based on the victim’s own subjective fear, see K.N.B., 259 A.3d at 351-52, the point at which there is a continued risk of harm is innately tied to the victim’s subjective experience and the unique circumstances of the particular case. As a general matter, however, it is clear that a plaintiff has no basis for relief under the Act until the plaintiff is able to prove that he or she is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant. With no continued risk of harm, the action does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Therefore, we conclude that the six-year statute of limitations for actions brought under the Act begins to run from the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrates that a plaintiff, or appropriate individual, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant, as this is the moment an action accrues.
In reaching this result, we acknowledge that a cause of action typically accrues “when an injury is inflicted.” Rice, 255 A.3d at 246 (citation omitted). However, the remedy provided by the Act is distinguishable from most civil actions in that it provides prospective relief to protect against future risk of harm, rather than compensation for past injury. A plaintiff does not need to prove any injury under the Act to be granted a protective order. See E.A.M., 173 A.3d at 319 (explaining that a victim need not prove that he or she was a victim of sexual violence or intimidation, or that the defendant was convicted of a crime to obtain a protective order under the Act). Thus, the occurrence of sexual violence or intimidation, by itself, does not give rise to relief under the Act. Instead, a plaintiff must prove a continued risk of harm from the defendant to obtain a protective order. While in certain circumstances the continued risk of harm may arise on the same day of the act of sexual violence or intimidation, it is apparent that the element is independent from the injury inflicted by the defendant.
Our holding today, which clarifies when the six-year statute of limitations begins for actions brought pursuant to the Act, does not disturb K.N.B.’s holding that such actions are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See K.N.B., 259 A.3d at 352.
In this case, we have only been asked to determine if the six-year statute of limitations “begins to run from the date of the act of sexual violence or intimidation committed by [McKelvey], instead of from the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrated a continued risk of harm to [Weatherholtz].” 323 A.3d 585, 586 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam). The Superior Court—finding in favor of McKelvey on this issue—did not pass upon other issues raised by McKelvey, including whether the encounter at the flea market was sufficient to entitle Weatherholtz to relief under the Act. Accordingly, we remand to the Superior Court to review the remaining claims of error raised by McKelvey.
See Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 633 Pa. 51, 123 A.3d 731, 756 (Pa. 2015) (“[I]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
We hold that the six-year statute of limitations for actions brought under the Act begins to run from the date of the act or circumstance that demonstrates that a plaintiff, or appropriate individual, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant, as this is the moment an action accrues. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand to the Superior Court to review the remaining claims of error raised by McKelvey.
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Wecht, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.
Justice Dougherty files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
• The Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 62A01-62A20 permits victims of sexual violence or intimidation to seek an order protecting them from the perpetrator of sexual abuse.
• The issue is when the six-year statute of limitations is applicable to such petitions for protective orders begins to run.
• The court held that the limitation begins to run on the date of the act or circumstance. The act or circumstance demonstrates that a plaintiff, or appropriate individual is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant, as this is the moment an action accrues.
• Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
