Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, LLC I/P/A Sky Zone, 2025 Pa. LEXIS 1501 (September 25, 2025) Donohue, J.
Judges: TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Wecht, Mundy and McCaffery join the opinion. Justice Brobson files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
Opinion by: DONOHUE.
Appellants, Philly Trampoline Park, LLC and Sky Zone (collectively “Sky Zone”), operate trampoline parks. Patrons who wish to enter the parks must execute Sky Zone’s “Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of the Risk” document (“Agreement”). When the patron is a minor, a parent is required to execute the Agreement on the minor’s behalf. These appeals involve minors who were injured at Sky Zone facilities. In each case, only one parent signed the Agreement on the behalf of their child. The Court is asked to resolve whether, under these circumstances, the Agreement is enforceable against the claims of the injured minor and the non-signing parent. We conclude that it is not and therefore affirm the orders of the Superior Court.
In recognition of their legal disability, minors are protected through a series of rules of civil procedure that govern actions where a minor is a party. See Pa.R.C.P. 2026-2049.
These rules establish a framework that ensures the litigation is serving the minor’s interests. For instance, Rule 2027 mandates that “[w]hen a party to an action, a minor shall be represented by a guardian who shall supervise and control the conduct of the
action in behalf of the minor.” Pa.R.C.P. 2027. This guardian “derives no benefit from serving in that capacity” but rather is simply “one by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.” Bertinelli v. Galoni, 200 A. 58, 59 (Pa. 1938). While a minor “may select a guardian,” that selection is subject to the court’s continuing authority to remove the guardian if it determines that cause for removal exists. Pa.R.C.P. 2031(a), 2033; see also Bertinelli, 200 A. at 59 (providing those acts of guardian representing a minor “are always subject to the control and supervision of the court, which has the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the [minor’s] best interests”). The court must approve any settlement, compromise or discontinuance of an action in which a minor is a party. Pa.R.C.P. 2039(a).
Other relevant principles relate to the role of a minor’s guardian. A guardian is “invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking care of the person and/or managing the property rights of another person[.]” In re Stapas, 820 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. Commw. 2003). The law recognizes two categories of guardians: guardians of the person, who are “invested with the care of the person of the minor[,]” and guardians of the estate, who are “entrusted with the control of the property of the minor.” Id. These are “distinct and mutually exclusive” spheres of authority. Id. Accordingly, parents, who are recognized as natural guardians with rights to the care and custody of their minor children, have “no authority whatever to exercise any control over the estate of the minor.” Brill, 127 A. at 843; see also In re Schulz’ Est., 98 A.2d 176, 179 (Pa. 1953) (“A parent has no authority to sell and convey the interest of a minor child in real or personal property.”) (citing Senser v. Bower, 1 Pen. & W. 450 (Pa. 1830)).
Finally, we recognize that there is a vested property right in an accrued cause of action. Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 930 (Pa. 2004); Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 69 A. 821, 823 (Pa. 1908). When a minor is injured, the parents and the minor have separate actionable claims; the parents have a claim for medical expenses and the loss of the minor’s services, and the minor has claims for pain and suffering and for losses after minority. Dellacasse v. Floyd, 2 A.2d 860, 862 n.1 (Pa. 1938).
In short, the cases upon which Sky Zone relies lack consideration of any protections for minors, which are a chief concern of our law. O’Leary’s Est., 42 A.2d at 625. We cannot ignore that submitting a claim to arbitration is not merely forum selection, but the selection of a forum devoid of judicial protection of the minor’s interests. We reiterate that under the law of our Commonwealth, minors are deemed to labor under a disability, which includes lacking the ability to make reasoned decisions regarding their property. Our Rules of Civil Procedure are constructed to recognize that disability and ameliorate the consequences of that status when claims are brought implicating a cause of action vested in a minor. As a predicate, a cause of action cannot be advanced by a minor on their own behalf, see Pa.R.C.P. 2027, and, critically, the court at all times has the obligation to monitor the conduct of the litigation to protect the child’s best interests. Pa.R.C.P. 2031, 2039. Arbitration strips the minor of these protections and a parent, as a natural guardian, has no authority to agree to a private adjudication of a minor child’s legal interest. Submitting a claim to arbitration deprives a minor of these protective procedural measures.
We recognize the aspect of appellees’ argument that the arbitration provision is invalid because embedded within its terms is language requiring that all claims must be brought within one year of the date of the injury, thereby robbing minors of the protection of the statutory tolling of minors’ claims. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533(b); Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 237 A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. 2020). We also acknowledge appellees’ arguments assailing the Agreement’s release provisions and their position that if the arbitration provision is deemed enforceable against minors, then so too would the release provisions and the shortening of the limitations period. See Santiagos’ Brief at 21-22; Shultzes’ Brief at 16-17. We also note Sky Zone’s position that a finding of enforceability as to the arbitration provision does not make the enforceability of the Agreement’s remaining provisions a foregone conclusion, and that if minors are required to submit their claims to arbitration, “[s]uch a finding will not require [minors] to release” claims against Sky Zone. Sky Zone’s Brief, 25 EAP 2023, at 24-25.
Our conclusion that parents cannot bind their minor children to an agreement to arbitrate their claims obviates the need to address the other terms of the arbitration provision, including the purported shortening of the limitations period contained in the arbitration provision here. As for the parties’ arguments regarding the Agreement’s release provisions, the issue that this Court accepted for review concerns the enforceability of the arbitration provision only, see Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, LLC, 304 A.3d 330 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam); Shultz v. Sky Zone, 304 A.3d 331 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). While the policies and procedures protecting minors because of their legal disability may foreshadow the disposition of those arguments, they are outside of the scope of this appeal.
Parents, as natural guardians, do not have an inherent authority to “intermeddle” with the property of their minor children, which includes legal causes of action. “Intermeddling” undoubtedly includes forfeiting the right to have claims adjudicated in a court of law where the prosecution of a minor’s claim is subject to the oversight and control of the court to insure pursuit of the minor’s best interests. For these reasons, we find that parents are without authority to bind a minor child to an agreement to arbitrate. The orders of the Superior Court are affirmed. Chief Justice Todd and Justices Wecht, Mundy and McCaffery join the opinion. Justice Brobson files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
