Davis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178235 (September 10, 2025) Munley, J.
Opinion by United States District Judge, Julia K. Munley.
Plaintiffs Brian Davis and Susan Davis bring this declaratory judgment action against Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), disputing the total amount of UIM coverage available under their policy. Before the court are cross-filed motions for summary judgment. Nationwide stands firm in its prelitigation position that Plaintiff Brian Davis executed a valid written request to reduce his UIM coverage below his bodily injury limits using a sign-down form. Plaintiffs dispute that this form applies to the Nationwide policy that was in place when they made a UIM claim.
The operative declarations page for the One Product policy reflects that, on the date of the accident, plaintiffs carried $300,000 in bodily injury coverage for each person/each occurrence in the event of their own liability. The declarations page further indicates that plaintiffs’ UIM limits were $15,000 each person/$30,000 each occurrence (non-stacked) in the event of an accident with an underinsured motorist. Id. To date, Nationwide has paid plaintiffs $45,000 in stacked UIM benefits.
Despite the changes instituted by Nationwide to their auto insurance policy, plaintiffs accepted the One Product policy and renewed that policy at least four times between August 2020 and the accident in September 2022. Nationwide thus argues that the UIM reduction form and 1791 Notice signed by Brian Davis remains effective and preclude the declaratory relief sought in this action.
The cross-motions for summary judgment center on whether the sign-down form executed by Plaintiff Brian Davis in 2019 under the prior policy legally effectuated a reduction of plaintiffs’ UIM coverage with respect to the One Product policy in place at the time of the accident in 2022. The issues in this case have been well-briefed and are ripe for disposition.
The parties do not dispute the material facts in this case. It is undisputed that Plaintiff Brian Davis signed and dated a form reducing his UIM coverage below his bodily injury limits on January 25, 2019, and that he was involved in an auto accident with an underinsured motorist on September 8, 2022. In between those two points, Nationwide implemented its One Product Initiative as its customers renewed their auto policies. This implementation resulted in changes, including to the plaintiffs’ policy number. In its determination regarding plaintiffs’ UIM coverage, Nationwide relied upon on a sign-down form executed by Brian Davis under the prior policy and not the One Product policy. Plaintiffs reject the validity of that form and seek reformation of the operative policy to afford them UIM limits of up to $900,000 as of the date of the accident. Consequently, the only question posed by the cross-motions is the coverage limit for UIM benefits under the One Product policy in effect on September 8, 2022. Based on the undisputed material facts, this is a question of law that can be properly decided at the summary judgment stage.
In light of the above cases, Section 1731(a) makes the purchase of UIM coverage optional, Section 1734 allows insureds to select whether their UIM coverage is issued in an amount equal to or less than their bodily injury liability limits, and Section 1791 “permits an insurer to rely on elections and notices regarding the availability of UIM benefits at the time of application for original coverage.” Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. McNear, 2025 PA Super 48, 332 A.3d 849, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025) (citing 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1791; Koch v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 2022 PA Super 131, 280 A.3d 1060, 1068 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Co., 2004 PA Super 145, 849 A.2d 277, 281 (2004)) (emphasis removed).
In this case, plaintiffs did not purchase new UIM coverage following an initial rejection of such coverage. Plaintiffs never rejected UIM coverage at all. Rather, here as a named insured, Plaintiff Brian Davis elected UIM limits below his bodily injury limits on January 25, 2019, and then did not make any changes to such coverage within the relevant timeframe up to the date of the accident. Plaintiffs continued to renew their policies with Nationwide every six months with the reduced UIM coverage that Brian Davis selected in January 2019 until the date of the accident, including even following when the policy number changed. This record is devoid of any facts indicating that plaintiffs ever desired to alter their selection and pay for UIM coverage equivalent to their bodily injury liability coverage before or after implementation of the One Product policy. See Blood, 934 A.2d at 1227. Plaintiffs accepted the One Product policy and continued to pay the renewal premiums for UIM limits below their bodily injury limits. The Nationwide policies were never cancelled, and plaintiffs’ auto insurance coverage never lapsed. Plaintiffs continued to rely upon the One Product policy for their financial responsibility under the
MVFRL. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs are not entitled to more UIM coverage than the coverage they specifically requested and paid for. Orsag, 15 A.3d at 901; Eachus, 306 A.3d at 936. Consequently, Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
In this case, plaintiffs seek to change state law, that is, import their extensive arguments about “renewal” policies and “new” policies into Sections 1731(a) and 1734, and, by extension, Section 1791. The court, however, cannot extend the analysis conducted in McGuire about whether the One Product policy was a “renewal” or not or otherwise endorse its application in this case. The court will not write into the MVFRL that “the change here is a delivery or issuance of a policy” under Section 1731. Blood, 934 A.2d at 1227; see also Smith, 849 A.2d at 280. This court is without authority to change the text of Sections 1734 and 1791 to impose new requirements on Nationwide in the face of unambiguous statutory language relieving them of obligations once an insured provides a written, signed request electing UIM coverage in amounts lower than the limits of liability for bodily injury. See Blood, 934 A.2d at 1226-27; see also McNear, 332 A.3d at 854-859. The court also cannot eliminate the freedom of choice provided to insureds by the General Assembly when it amended the MVFRL to make UIM coverage optional. See Lewis, 793 A.2d at 154. Plaintiff Brian Davis made a valid election to reduce his UIM coverage below his bodily injury liability limits. Plaintiffs thus requested and paid lower policy premiums than if their UIM coverage was equal to that level. They paid renewal premiums for such coverage under both policy numbers. Plaintiffs’ choice of limited UIM coverage thus binds them in this litigation.
As for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, at least four decisions support the proposition that it would not read the remedy of reformation found in Section 1731(c.1) into Sections 1731(a) and 1734, at least where a plaintiff has previously supplied a written, signed request for lower UIM limits to their insurer. See Orsag, 15 A.3d at 901; Blood, 934 A.2d at 1223, n.3, 1224, 1226-27 (distinguishing Cebula and finding no remedy where insureds previously elected reduction of UIM limits below bodily injury limits); Lewis, 793 A.2d at 153-54 (distinguishing provisions of Sections 1731(c.1) and 1734); Salazar, 702 A.2d at 1044 (finding no remedy after insurer complied with Sections 1731 and 1791, but did not comply with the requirements of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1791.1). Here, as Nationwide insureds, plaintiffs executed several written requests for lower UIM benefits, as far back as August 2001. Consequently, the court predicts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not reform the contract as plaintiffs request and would decide the issues at hand in favor of Nationwide. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment will thus be denied, Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment will be granted, and summary judgment will thus be entered in defendant’s favor.
