Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2025 Pa. LEXIS 442 (Pa. Super. Ct., April 9, 2025) (Mundy, J.)
JUSTICE MUNDY
In March 2016, thirteen-year-old J.R. Gustafson tragically died after he was accidentally shot by his fourteen-year-old friend (the Juvenile) at the home of another. After J.R.’s death, his parents, Mark and Leah Gustafson filed the underlying action against Springfield Armory, the manufacturer of the firearm used to shoot J.R., and Saloom Department Store, the retailer that sold the firearm. The trial court sustained preliminary objections filed by Springfield and Saloom (collectively, the Defendants) and dismissed the Gustafsons’ complaint with prejudice. In doing so, the court relied on the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA or the Act), which bars certain civil actions against firearms manufacturers and sellers from being brought in either state or federal court. On appeal, an en banc panel of the Superior Court issued a per curiam order reversing the trial court’s sustaining of preliminary objections and remanding the case for further proceedings. We granted allowance of appeal to address whether the PLCAA operates to bar the Gustafsons’ action and, if so, whether the PLCAA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and principles of federalism. After careful and sober consideration, we answer those questions affirmatively. We therefore reverse the Superior Court’s per curiam order and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the Gustafsons’ action with prejudice.
We conclude that Plaintiffs’ alleged harm resulted from the Juvenile’s “criminal or unlawful misuse” of the Firearm and, as such, their action constitutes a “qualified civil liability action” pursuant to the PLCAA, unless one of the Act’s enumerated exceptions is found to apply.
The Product Liability Exception
The PLCAA commands courts to dismiss actions that satisfy the definition of a “qualified civil liability action.” However, otherwise-prohibited qualified civil liability actions “shall not include” any action that satisfies any of the PLCAA’s six exceptions as set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi). Plaintiffs assert their action satisfies the “product liability exception” in Section 7903(5)(A)(v), which exempts from the definition of “qualified civil liability actions:” [A]n action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death personal injuries or property damage[.] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). Here, the parties do not contest that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is “an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner[.]” (only arguing the “exception to the exception” renders the product liability exception inapplicable). The issue therefore is whether Plaintiffs’ claim falls into the “exception to the exception,” i.e., whether the “discharge of the [Firearm] was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). Plaintiffs insist the requirements of the exception to the exception are not met because the discharge of the Firearm was neither a “volitional act” nor a “criminal offense.”
We agree with the Travieso court that the exception to the exception is triggered by the criminal nature of the act rather than whether the shooter faced or could have faced criminal prosecution. As such, we determine that the phrase “criminal offense” in the product liability exception includes actions by juveniles that constitute “an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth.
We determine that the product liability exception does not exempt Plaintiffs’ Complaint from the PLCAA’s definition of a “qualified civil liability action.” The PLCAA, therefore, bars Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
The facts of the instant matter make clear that the interstate nature of the firearms industry cannot be disputed. Defendant Springfield, who designed, manufactured, and sold the Firearm, is an Illinois corporation. Defendant Saloom sold the Firearm in retail in Pennsylvania and is a Pennsylvania limited liability company. Id. at ¶ 19. The shooting also occurred here in Pennsylvania. A firearm designed and manufactured by an Illinois corporation that was sold and used in Pennsylvania necessarily must have been involved in interstate commerce in some manner. Further, it cannot be disputed, as evidenced by the numerous cases cited within this opinion, that the firearms industry has faced, and will likely continue to face, litigation over its products. Under these circumstances, we determine that it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that these suits would financially impact the firearms industry. See 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3) (“Lawsuits have been commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek money damages and other relief[.]” (emphasis added)). Given this conclusion, we hold it was completely reasonable for Congress to find that these suits “constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States[,]” 15 U.S. § 7901(a)(6), and to enact the PLCAA to “prevent the use of such lawsuits to impose unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce.” Id. at § 7901(b)(4).
Plaintiffs further assert the PLCAA, through the predicate exception, violates the Tenth Amendment and federalism principles by impermissibly intruding on states’ lawmaking authority and infringing on their sovereign right to allocate their lawmaking powers as they see fit. Plaintiffs contend the authority of states to make law through their courts is a core aspect of their sovereignty and Congress does not have authority to determine what branch of state government is used to make state law. Plaintiffs Brief at 49 (citing Erie R.R., 304 U.S. at 78). According to Plaintiffs, through the predicate exception, Congress essentially determined that states are required to enact laws regulating the firearms industry though their legislatures rather than their courts. In this sense, Plaintiffs analogize the PLCAA to the New York Court of Appeals decision in In re Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579 (N.Y. App. Div, 2nd Dep’t 2015), where the court, in addressing a federal statute regarding the granting of professional licenses to undocumented immigrants, stated “[t]he ability, indeed the right of the states to structure their governmental decision-making process as they see fit is essential to sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 53 (quoting Vargas, 131 A.D.3d at 24.). In addition to the arguments made in their brief on this issue, Plaintiffs also adopt the arguments made by their amicus Federalism Scholars, a group of constitutional law professors. According to amici, the PLCAA impermissibly intrudes on states’ ability to allocate their law-making authority between their legislatures and courts, through the predicate exception and concludes “[a] congressional enactment, like [the] PLCAA that denies state court authority to declare state law and requires instead exclusive reliance on legislatures for the definitive pronouncement of that state’s law invades the core of state sovereignty.” Id. at 24 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999)).
Assuming Plaintiffs and the Federalism Scholars are correct that the federal government does not have authority to dictate to states which branch of their government shall enact certain laws, we agree with the United States that that principle is not applicable to the PLCAA. See United States Brief at 19. The reason, as explained above, is straightforward: nothing in the PLCAA dictates to the states which branch of government they can use to enact any laws.16 The Act merely bars certain civil actions from being brought. The predicate exception does not alter this conclusion as the exception merely excludes certain statutory based claims from that general [*67] bar. States remain free to enact any law they wish through any branch of government they wish without any restriction from the PLCAA.
Plaintiffs’ action is a qualified civil liability action pursuant to the PLCAA and does not qualify under the Act’s product liability exception. As such, the PLCAA operates to bar Plaintiffs’ action. Further, the PLCAA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and does not violate the Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism. We therefore vacate the Superior Court’s per curiam order reversing the trial court and remand for reinstatement of the trial court’s order sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer. Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the opinion. Justice McCaffery did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
