Jorjani v. N.J. Inst. of Tech., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 23109 (September 8, 2025) Matey, Circuit Judge.
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.
MATEY, Circuit Judge.
New Jersey Institute of Technology declined to renew a lecturer’s contract based on his private comments about race, politics, and immigration. But NJIT’s regulation of speech outside the classroom and off the campus is subject to the restraints of the First Amendment, and the school documented no disruption to its educational mission. So, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment.
The restraints of the First Amendment on public employment actions arise from caselaw. As we have explained, “[t]o state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee plaintiff must allege that his activity is protected by the First Amendment, and that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.” Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). If those two requirements are satisfied, the burden shifts and the employer must show “the same action would have been taken even if the speech had not occurred.” Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014).
A public employee’s speech is protected if 1) “the employee spoke as a citizen,” 2) his “statement involved a matter of public concern,” and 3) “the government employer did not have ‘an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other
member of the general public’ as a result of the statement he made.” Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185 (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2006)). In assessing the third prong, we “balance . . . the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). So “the more substantially an employee’s speech involves matters of public concern, the higher the state’s burden will then be to justify taking action, and vice versa.” Fenico v. City of Philadelphia, 70 F.4th 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2023); see also Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991.
First, there is no support for NJIT’s contention that student disapproval of Jorjani’s speech disrupted the administration of the university. Some students and alumni disagreed with Jorjani’s views. But NJIT never identified the exact number of calls or complaints made in person or writing, nor any details about the students’ concerns. And although Jorjani said that he perceived a “huge change in attitude toward [him] on the part of [his] students,” NJIT points to no objective evidence that students questioned Jorjani’s ability to teach, grade, or supervise his classes evenly, beyond one administrator recalling a student dropped Jorjani’s class. Entirely absent is any evidence of specific student protests, upheaval, or unwillingness to abide by university policies. But “in the context of the college classroom,” students have an “interest in hearing even contrarian views.”
Second, the cited disputes among Jorjani and his colleagues are not disruption. NJIT cites the pointed letters denouncing Jorjani published by faculty in the pages of the student newspaper, but that is precisely the sort of reasoned debate that distinguishes speech from distraction. And there is no allegation these editorials, or Jorjani’s belief they were defamatory and warranted suit, interfered with the ability of other faculty to fulfill their responsibilities in research, teaching, or shared governance, or otherwise thwarted the university’s efforts to educate its students. So, although challenges to “employee harmony” might pose disruption when disagreements disturb “close working relationships,” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 472, that concern is irrelevant inside the university where professors serve the needs of their students, not fellow academics.
On balance, the disruption NJIT described does not outweigh even minimal interest in Jorjani’s speech, so the District Court erred in concluding Jorjani’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment. We will vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
· New Jersey Institute of Technology declined to renew a lecturer’s contract based on his private comments about race, politics and immigration.
· Regulation of speech outside the classroom and off campus is subject to the restraint First Amendment and the school documented no disruption to its educational mission.
· Therefore, the district court judgment was reversed.
· A public employee’s speech is protected if 1) the employee spoke as a citizen 2) the statement involved a matter of public concern and 3) the government
employer did not have an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public as a result of the statement being made.
· Court found that there was insufficient evidence of student disapproval of the speech or disruption of the administration of the university.
· The fact that people disagreed is not enough to show disruption of the campus.
· The entirely absent is any evidence of student protest, come upheaval or an unwillingness to abide by university policies.
· Any dispute among colleagues is not a disruption.
· The disruption NJIT described does not outweigh even minimal interest in Jorjani’s speech, and therefore the district court erred in concluding the speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
