Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332 (June 27, 2025) Alito, J.
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Board of Education of Montgomery County, Maryland (Board), has introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks into the elementary school curriculum. These books—and associated educational instructions provided to teachers —are designed to “disrupt” children’s thinking about sexuality and gender. The Board has told parents that it will not give them notice when the books are going to be used and that their children’s attendance during those periods is mandatory. A group of parents from diverse religious backgrounds sued to enjoin those policies. They assert that the new curriculum, combined with the Board’s decision to deny opt outs, impermissibly burdens their religious exercise.
Today, we hold that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction. A government burdens the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to submit their children to instruction that poses “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 218, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972). And a government cannot condition the benefit of free public education on parents’ acceptance of such instruction. Based on these principles, we conclude that the parents are likely to succeed in their challenge to the Board’s policies.
To begin, we hold that the parents are likely to succeed on their claim that the Board’s policies unconstitutionally burden their religious exercise. “[W]e have long recognized the rights of parents to direct ‘the religious upbringing’ of their children.” Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. 464, 486, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2020) (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213-214, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15). And we have held that those rights are violated by government policies that “substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of children. Id., at 218, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15. Such interference, we have observed, “carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Ibid. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that such an “objective danger” is present here.
At its heart, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects “the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through the performance of” religious acts. Kennedy, 597 U. S., at 524, 142 S. Ct. 2407, 213 L. Ed. 2d 755 (internal quotation marks omitted). And for many people of faith across the country, there are few religious acts more important than the religious education of their children. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 754, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 207 L. Ed. 2d 870 (2020) (“Religious education is vital to many faiths practiced in the United States”). Indeed, for many Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others, the religious education of children is not merely a preferred practice but rather a religious obligation. See id., at 754-756, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 207 L. Ed. 2d 870. The parent petitioners in this case reflect this reality: they all believe they have a “sacred obligation” or “God-given responsibility” to raise their children in a way that is consistent with their religious beliefs and practices.
The practice of educating one’s children in one’s religious beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a generous measure of protection from our Constitution. “Drawing on ‘enduring American tradition,’ we have long recognized the rights of parents to direct ‘the religious upbringing’ of their children.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213-214, 232, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15). And this is not merely a right to teach religion in the confines of one’s own home. Rather, it extends to the choices that parents wish to make for their children outside the home. It protects, for example, a parent’s decision to send his or her child to a private religious school instead of a public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 532-535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925).
Due to financial and other constraints, however, many parents “have no choice but to send their children to a public school.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 424, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 168 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). As a result, the right of parents “to direct the religious upbringing of their” children would be an empty promise if it did not follow those children into the public-school classroom. We have thus recognized limits on the government’s ability to interfere with a student’s religious upbringing in a public-school setting.
In light of the record before us, we hold that the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to forbid opt outs— substantially interferes with the religious development of their children and imposes the kind of burden on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable.
The government’s operation of the public schools is not a matter of “internal affairs” akin to the administration of Social Security or the selection of “filing cabinets.” Id., at 700, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 735 (majority opinion). It implicates direct, coercive interactions between the State and its young residents. The public school imposes rules and standards of conduct on its students and holds a limited power to discipline them for misconduct. See, e.g., Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L., 594 U. S. 180, 187-188, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 210 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2021). If questions of public-school curriculum were purely a matter of internal affairs, one could imagine that other First Amendment protections—such as the right to free speech or the right to be free from established religion—would also be inapplicable in the public-school context. But our precedents plainly provide otherwise. See Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731; Weisman, 505 U. S., at 587, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467.
To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its policy “advances ‘interests of the highest order’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.” Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2021) (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)). In its filings before us, the Board asserts that its curriculum and no-opt-out policy serve its compelling interest in “maintaining a school environment that is safe and conducive to learning for all students.” Brief for Respondents 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). It relies on the statements of an MCPS official who testified that permitting opt outs would result in “significant disruptions to the classroom environment” and would expose certain students to “social stigma and isolation.”
The Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, places an unconstitutional burden on the parents’ rights to the free exercise of their religion. The parents have therefore shown that they are likely to succeed in their free exercise claims. They have likewise shown entitlement to a preliminary injunction pending the completion of this lawsuit. In the absence of an injunction, the parents will continue to be put to a choice: either risk their child’s exposure to burdensome instruction or pay substantial sums for alternative educational services. As we have explained that choice unconstitutionally burdens the parents’ religious exercise, and “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14, 19, 141 S. Ct. 63, 208 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Furthermore, in light of the strong showing made by the parents here, and the lack of a compelling interest supporting the Board’s policies, an injunction is both equitable and in the public interest. The petitioners should receive preliminary relief while this lawsuit proceeds. See Winter, 555 U. S., at 20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d [**731] 249. Specifically, until all appellate review in this case is completed, the Board should be ordered to notify them in advance whenever one of the books in question or any other similar book is to be used in any way and to allow them to have their children excused from that instruction.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
• School board’s introduction of LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks along with the decision to withhold opt outs, places them in a constitutional burden to the parent’s rights to the free exercise of their religion.
• The parents are therefore shown a likelihood of success in their free exercise claims.
• They have shown an entitlement to a preliminary injunction pending completion of the lawsuit.
• The choice faced by the parents unconstitutionally burdens the parents religious exercise and the loss of first amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.
• A strong showing has been made by parents.
• An injunction is both equitable and in the public interest.
• The board should notify the parents in advance whenever one of the books is to be used in any way and the children should be allowed to be excused from instruction.
