Sherice Sargent ex rel. Child. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3263 (February 2, 2026) Hardiman, Circuit Judge.
Before Judges: Hardiman, Krause, and Freeman, Circuit Judges.
Three parents of Philadelphia students appeal to the District Court’s summary judgment rejecting their Equal Protection challenge to the School District’s 2022 Admissions Policy for four selective high schools. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the District Court held that no reasonable factfinder could find that the Admissions Policy had either a racially discriminatory purpose or impact. So, it applied rational basis review and upheld the Policy. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the parents, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the Admissions Policy had a discriminatory purpose and impact, requiring strict scrutiny. We will therefore vacate and remand for a factfinder to assess discriminatory purpose and impact.
We join the Second Circuit in holding that, while evidence of an aggregate discriminatory impact may satisfy the “discriminatory impact” inquiry, it is not the only permissible form of proof. Appellants must show that “similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated differently.” Lower Merion, 665 F.3d at 550. To determine whether they have met this burden, the District Court may look to the aggregate disparate impact data the parties have provided. Statistically significant changes in so-called “before-and-after” data are relevant, including, but not limited to, year-over-year changes to enrollment by race, “qualified applicants” by race, and success rates by race. But on remand, the District Court at trial may also look to whether any plaintiff has shown that he or she “has been negatively affected or harmed by [the] discriminatory law or policy based on race.” Chinese Am. Citizens All., 116 F.4th at 173; see also Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 319 (2017) (“[I]n no area of our equal protection law have we forced plaintiffs to submit one particular form of proof to prevail.”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003) (describing the injury there as “the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate ability to obtain the benefit.”). While the form of proof necessary to show that the Admissions Policy caused a reduced likelihood of admission on an individual or aggregate basis may vary, the District Court must ensure that the discriminatory impact is real and identifiable because discriminatory purpose without an actual injury is insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under our caselaw. Cf. Chinese Am. Citizens All., 116 F.4th at 176-77 (explaining that the “unequal treatment” of Asian Americans students by excluding them from reserved seats was the injury demonstrating discriminatory impact).
Based on the data in the record—including admissions offers year-over-year, the changes in the “qualified applicant” pool resulting from the new criteria, and the demographics of the chosen zip codes—a reasonable factfinder could infer that the 2022 Admissions Policy increased Black and Hispanic students’ chances of admission to Palumbo, Carver, Central, and Masterman while decreasing Asian and white students’ chances. We therefore hold that the record supports, though it does not compel, a finding that the Admissions Policy had both the purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Philadelphia School District’s Anti-Racism Declaration aspired to “center [its] work through the lens of racial equity.” To that end, it tried to “mak[e] progress towards” achieving a student body’s racial composition proportional to the broader population. After conducting an “equity lens review” of its policies, it adopted the 2022 Admissions Policy. That Policy changed the admissions qualifications and gave preference to six zip codes with disproportionately high Black and Hispanic populations relative to their white and/or Asian American populations. School District officials made public and private statements—both before and after the enactment of the Admissions Policy—that could support a finding that the Policy was intended to alter (and did alter) the racial makeup of the schools.
A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the School District acted with a discriminatory purpose. A reasonable factfinder could also determine that the Admissions Policy had a discriminatory impact. The data here—though imperfect—reveal potentially significant changes in the racial composition of the “qualified applicant” pool and the student body from 2021 to 2022. And the record shows that the benefits of the zip code policy were more likely to flow to individuals of certain races than others, consistent with the School District’s push for proportional representation at its most competitive high schools.
For those reasons, we will vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Evidence of discriminatory impact may satisfy “discriminatory impact” inquiry.
Creating an admissions policy likely to benefit one group over another would be discriminatory and a violation of equal protection.
Based on the data in the record, and the changes in the “qualified applicant” pool resulted from new criteria, and the demographics of the chosen zip codes, a reasonable factfinder could infer that the new Admissions Policy increased Black and Hispanic students’ chances of admission to certain preferred schools decreasing Asian and White students chances.
We therefore hold that the record supports, though it does not compel, a finding that the Admissions Policy had both the purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
