Montanez v. Price, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 26131 (October 8, 2025) Kraus, J.
Judges: Before Krause, Bibas, and Ambro, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Kraus, Circuit Judge.
The protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12101et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. §701 et seq., do not stop at the prison gates. So, when an inmate, whether counseled or pro se, claims that prison officials ignored his serious medical needs and failed to accommodate his disability, the courthouse doors must be open for a fair hearing. That was not the case for Appellant Jose Montanez, whose claims were dismissed with prejudice even though his complaint, liberally construed, states an Eighth Amendment claim against several defendants in their individual capacities, a claim under the RA against Wellpath Care LLC, and a claim under both the ADA and RA against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As to his other claims, Montanez’s pleading was insufficient, but his briefs in opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss make clear that amendment would not have been futile, so the District Court erred by not granting him leave to amend. We will therefore affirm the District Court in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to allow Montanez to amend his complaint in accordance with this opinion.
On August 28, 2021, Jose Montanez stood up in his cell at SCI-Huntingdon and suddenly collapsed, his body numb from the chest down. Lying on the cell floor, Montanez alerted a nearby guard to his condition, and the guard soon returned with another prison officer. Montanez was then forced to “drag his body over to the cell door” before he was eventually taken to the medical unit in a wheelchair by Appellee Nurse Melanie Wagman. Once in the medical unit, Nurse Wagman took Montanez’s vitals and felt around his legs. She then phoned Appellee Dr. Rajinder Mahli, who instructed her to move Montanez from his third-floor cell to a cell on the first floor and said he would evaluate Montanez the next day. When Montanez—still paralyzed from the waist down—learned that he would not be evaluated or treated until the next day, he asked to be taken to the hospital, but Nurse Wagman responded, “you’re not going to the hospital,” and laughed at the request. Nurse Wagman then wheeled Montanez to the door of his new cell, where she ordered him to “get out of the wheelchair,” offering him no assistance, forcing him to drag his limp body “across [his] cell to the bed,” and leaving him “exhausted and in so much pain.” The next day, Dr. Mahli came to examine Montanez, but he, too, did not enter the cell, and ordered Montanez to “walk for him.” Montanez was still unable to stand, let alone walk, so he again dragged his paralyzed body across the cell floor as Dr. Mahli watched. And when Montanez informed Dr. Mahli that he was also involuntarily urinating on himself, Dr. Mahli simply “nodded” and “walked off,” doing nothing to help Montanez with his sudden paralysis or incontinence. Montanez was then left alone in his cell in this condition—paralyzed from his chest to his feet and uncontrollably urinating on himself—for another three days before receiving medical attention. At that point, Montanez was finally given an MRI that revealed spinal cord stenosis and spinal cord edema, requiring expedited back surgery in September 2021. Following surgery, Montanez was transferred to a private rehabilitation facility. A mere two weeks into rehabilitation and still unable to stand, Montanez was returned to detention, this time to the infirmary of a different Pennsylvania state prison, SCI-Rockview. There, he continued his recovery until he took a serious fall that caused him intense pain in his spine. None the less, the doctor on staff, Appellee Dr. Vernon Preston, refused to give him adequate pain medication. An x-ray revealed that Montanez had herniated a disc in his back in the fall, but SCI-Rockview’s Healthcare Administrator, Appellee Richard Ellers, “lied” to his doctor “about the results of the x-ray” to delay his treatment.
Two months later, Montanez was transferred back to SCI-Huntingdon, where he continued to suffer mobility issues and intense discomfort from his recent spinal surgery and subsequent spinal injury. So, he requested certain accommodations, including a double mattress to control his back pain while sleeping, a cane or crutches to facilitate walking, stronger medication for pain management, and access to physical therapy. Those requests were repeatedly denied by prison personnel.
Montanez raises three claims on appeal. He contends that the District Court erred by: (1) dismissing his Eighth Amendment claims; (2) dismissing his disability law claims under Title II and Section 504; and (3) dismissing the Complaint with prejudice rather than granting him leave to amend. We address each claim in turn.
Mere negligence, however—even if it constitutes medical malpractice—falls short of deliberate indifference. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). So does mere disagreement between the prisoner and medical personnel over the proper course of treatment. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, Montanez’s spinal cord stenosis and edema (which caused paralysis requiring surgery), his sudden incontinence, and the herniated disc he suffered after falling at SCI-Rockview easily qualify as serious medical needs. See, e.g., Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (lumbar stenosis is a serious medical need); Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236 (back condition that caused both “excruciating pain,” and multiple falls was serious medical need); McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 816, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2024) (prisoner with “spine and incontinence issues, resulting in significant back pain and difficulty controlling urination,” had serious medical needs). Thus, Montanez’s ability to state a claim for inadequate medical care turns on whether he has sufficiently pleaded deliberate indifference to any of these serious medical needs.
According to the Complaint, Dr. Mahli, despite knowing that Montanez was suddenly paralyzed and uncontrollably urinating on himself, provided no medical treatment and instead abandoned Montanez in this state for three days. Taken as true, these allegations do not represent mere disagreement with Dr. Mahli’s “medical judgment” or a particular “course of treatment.” Montanez v. Price, No. 3:22-CV-1267, 2023 WL 5435616, at *9-*10(M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2023). Rather, where “knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide that care,” as alleged here, “the deliberate indifference standard has been met.” MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346 (citation modified). That standard can also be met by a defendant abandoning a prisoner in a condition that unreasonably exposes him to “the threat of tangible residual injury,” as may be inferred from the allegations in the Complaint against Dr. Mahli. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235 (quoting MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346). On top of stating an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Mahli for inadequate medical care, the Complaint adequately pleads a second type of Eighth Amendment violation. Construing Montanez’s pro se Complaint “liberally, as we must,” Durham, 82 F.4th at 230, the facts alleged against Dr. Mahli—deserting Montanez in his cell with nothing to do but drag his urine-soaked, paralyzed body around his cell floor for three days before help arrived—are also sufficient to make out an unsanitary conditions-of-confinement claim, see Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8(2020)(per curiam) (forcing prisoner to live in his excrement for six days obviously violated the Eighth Amendment); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It would be an abomination of the Constitution to force a prisoner to live in his own excrement for four days…”).
The District Court correctly determined that Montanez failed to state a claim under §1983 against Wellpath. The Complaint mentions Wellpath once, alleging merely that it is the “entity contracting the medical staff who is also in this case.” But Wellpath cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees—Dr. Mahli, Dr. Preston, Dr. Edwards, and PA Nalley—under a theory of respondeat superior. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84. Rather, like municipalities, private corporations under contract to provide prison health services are liable only if their policies or customs caused the constitutional violation. See id.; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,436 U.S. 658, 694(1978). Because Montanez does not tie any of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations back to Wellpath’s policies or customs, he has failed to state a claim against that entity.
In sum, the District Court erred by dismissing Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Mahli. While it correctly determined that Montanez’s three-and-a-half-page, handwritten Complaint failed to state Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Preston, Dr. Edwards, PA Nalley, and Wellpath, the District Court erred in dismissing those claims with prejudice. Instead, as discussed further below, Montanez should have been granted an opportunity to amend.
The District Court properly dismissed Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claims insofar as Montanez sought damages against the Commonwealth and the Individual Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). It erred, however, in its treatment of the Individual Commonwealth Defendants in their personal capacities.
After Montanez collapsed and lost sensation from the chest down, Nurse Wagman allegedly provided no medical treatment other than briefly feeling around Montanez’s legs. Nor did she try to diagnose Montanez’s sudden paralysis. Instead, according to the Complaint, she laughed at his request to go to the hospital and, after transporting him to his new first-floor cell, did not help him into his cell and bed.
That is textbook deliberate indifference. Such conduct, as described, “entails the obduracy and wantonness that is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment” and is thus sufficient to state a claim against Nurse Wagman. Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537, 541 (holding that a prisoner’s claim that a nurse forced him “to crawl to a wheelchair despite indicating that he was unable to walk” created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the nurse “acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s serious medical needs).
Non-medical personnel generally will not be found deliberately indifferent for purposes of an Eighth Amendment inadequate-medical-care claim unless they have “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Put differently, when a “prisoner is under the care of medical experts…, a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”
For decades, the ADA and the RA have served as “twin pillars of federal disability discrimination law,” working in tandem to “secure the rights of individuals with disabilities to independence and full inclusion in American society.” Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 109-10 (3d Cir. 2018). Functionally, the ADA and the RA impose the “same prohibition,” but they cover different entities. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154,159 (2017). Along with proscribing discriminatory animus, both statutes also impose on covered entities an affirmative obligation to make “reasonable accommodations” for persons with disabilities so that they can meaningfully access their programs, services, and activities. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985); see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532-33 (2004). As then-Judge Jackson has observed, this duty is at its apex in the prison context “because inmates necessarily rely totally upon [prisons] for all of their needs while in custody and do not have the freedom to obtain such services (or the accommodations that permit them to access those services) elsewhere.” Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 269 (D.D.C. 2015).
Title II of the ADA prohibits a “public entity” from discriminating against disabled people, including by denying them equal access to their “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U.S.C. §12132. “Public entity” includes “(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” Id.§12131(1).
Section 504, in contrast, reaches only recipients of “[f]ederal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. §794(a). This “covers those who receive the aid” directly from the federal government or indirectly through another recipient of that aid. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606-07 (1986); see 28 C.F.R. §42.540(e) (“Recipient means any… public or private entity… to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient…”). “[F]ederal financial assistance,” in turn, includes federal grants, loans, non-procurement contracts, and “reimbursement through Medicare and Medicaid.” Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 217 (2022); see 28 C.F.R. §42.540(f) (defining “Federal financial assistance” as “any grant, cooperative agreement, loan, contract (other than a direct Federal procurement contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty),…or any other arrangement by which” the recipient receives federal funds, services, or property); 34 C.F.R. §104.3(h) (similar); 45 C.F.R. §84.10 (similar). And the purpose for which that financial assistance was intended is irrelevant because a recipient of federal financial assistance must comply with Section 504 in “all [their] operations,” not just the program or activity receiving the funding. 29 U.S.C. §794(b) (emphasis added); see Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, §4,102 Stat. 28, 29-30(1988).
Given these limitations, the Individual Commonwealth and Individual Medical Defendants are not subject to suit in their personal capacities. Neither state employees nor contractors are “public entities,” so they cannot be sued under Title II. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (dicta); see also Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). And because “the individual defendants do not receive federal aid,” they also cannot be liable under Section 504. Emerson, 296 F.3dat 190. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, is a public entity and receives federal funds, so it is a proper defendant under both Title II and Section 504. Pa.Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (“State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity.’”); Furgess v. Pa.Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288-93(3d Cir. 2019)(allowing Title II and Section 504 claims against the Commonwealth to proceed).
As for Wellpath, the results are mixed. There is no question that it cannot be sued under Title II. Even though Wellpath contracts with the Commonwealth to perform a traditional government function—providing medical services to state prisoners—that alone is not enough to transform a private corporation into an “instrumentality of a State.” 42 U.S.C. §12131(1); see Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1309-10(11th Cir. 2010)(concluding that a private prison management corporation operating a state prison is not a public entity); Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding that a private hospital providing services pursuant to a municipal contract is not a public entity). So, the ADA claim against Wellpath was properly dismissed.
But unless and until discovery establishes otherwise, Wellpath remains a proper defendant on the Section 504 claim. Montanez’s Complaint alleges that, on “information and belief, SCI-Huntingdon [and the] Pennsylvania Department of Corrections receive [] federal funding,” and that Wellpath is the “Medical Contractor at SCI-Huntingdon,” Thus, liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that Wellpath is an indirect recipient of federal funds. See Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 266 F.3d 152, 161& n.7 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that “an entity may receive federal financial assistance indirectly and still be considered a recipient for purposes of Title IX,” which “prohibits discrimination based on disability in substantially the same terms” as Section 504). Wellpath disputes this point, but that cannot be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage, where we must accept the allegations as true. See Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2025). As it currently stands, Wellpath is a proper defendant under Section 504. See 29 U.S.C. §794(b)(3)(A)(ii) (requiring a “corporation . . . or other private organization . . . which is principally engaged in the business of providing…health care” to refrain from disability discrimination in “all of [its]operations” if it directly or indirectly receives any “Federal financial assistance”).
Except for causation, the substantive standards for determining liability under Section 504 and Title II are identical, and the same remedies are available under both Acts. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 275 (3d Cir. 2014); 29 U.S.C. §794a (authorizing injunctive relief and money damages) 42 U.S.C. §12133 (same). To state a claim for disability-based discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or other activities for which a public entity is responsible, or was otherwise subjected to discrimination by a public entity; (4) by reason of his disability. Harberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018). In this case, the District Court erred in dismissing the disability law claims against the Commonwealth and Wellpath because the Complaint establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
We agree with the District Court that the first two elements are satisfied. Montanez, like all state prisoners, is a qualified individual covered by Title II and Section 504. Durham, 82 F.4th at 225. Anda “disability” is any “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A), which includes, among other things, “caring for oneself, . . . sleeping, walking, standing,” id. §12102(2)(A), and “the operation of a major bodily function,” such as “functions of the . . . bladder,” id. §12102(2)(B). So, Montanez’s spinal cord stenosis, spinal edema, incontinence, and herniated disc undoubtedly qualify as disabilities. See Durham, 82 F.4th at 225 (“lumbar stenosis” is a disability).
As to the third element, however, we cannot agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Montanez “wholly fails to allege that he was denied or excluded from any services, programs, or activities.” Montanez, 2023 WL 5435616, at *11. The phrases “service, program, or activity” under Title II and “program or activity” under Section 504 are “extremely broad in scope and include anything a public entity does.” Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289 (quoting Disability Rts. N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Hum.Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015)); see also 29 U.S.C. §794(b)(1)(A) (defining “program or activity” under Section 504 as “all of the operations of. . . a department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State”). Under this “all-encompassing” definition, Yeskey v. Com. of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, the Complaint plausibly alleges that Montanez was denied equal access to at least three different programs or services.
Montanez alleges he was denied meaningful access to “medical care” because of his disabilities, which is cognizable under Section 504 and Title II. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006). Second, the necessities for hygiene, including, showers, sinks, and toilets, are basic services prisons must provide. See id.at 155, 157; Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289-90. According to Montanez’s Complaint, he was abandoned in his cell for at least three days, paralyzed and urinating on himself, neither able to reach a toilet nor given an alternative way to relieve himself with dignity. This is a textbook example of a disabled prisoner being denied access to fundamental prison service. See McDaniel, 115 F.4th at 823 (“In a prison, qualifying programs and activities include meals, medical care, showers, toilets, and the like.”); Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022)(“We have no difficulty concluding that a handicapped-accessible toilet for disabled prisoners amounts to a service, the denial of which could establish a claim under either statute.”).
Third, given that all people need sleep, providing prisoners with accessible beds and “appropriate and adequate bedding…are ‘services’ of” a prison. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1224 n.44 (9th Cir. 2008); see Hall v. Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171, 1181 (8th Cir. 2023) (“A jail’s toilets, beds, and medical care are a ‘service’ under the ADA.”). Here, Montanez alleges that, on the first day of his paralysis, Nurse Wagman, rather than helping him to his bed or providing him with a handicap-accessible sleeping arrangement, simply dumped him in his cell and forced him to drag his paralyzed body across the floor and into his bed. And when he returned to SCI-Huntingdon after herniating a disc while recovering from major back surgery, his back condition—coupled with the lack of adequate pain medication—caused significant pain whenever he lay on his single mattress. That, in turn, interfered with his ability to sleep. But his requests for an accommodation, such as a double mattress, were repeatedly denied. So, construing the Complaint liberally, Montanez adequately pleaded that he could not access a bed on the same basis as “able-bodied inmates” and was denied a reasonable accommodation necessary for him to sleep without significant pain— “just like able-bodied inmates” could. Furgess, 933 F.3d at 291.
A plaintiff can meet the fourth element of a prima facie case—discrimination “by reason of his disability”—by showing invidious discrimination or a failure to provide reasonable accommodations. Harberle, 885 F.3d at 179-80. Montanez proceeds down the second path, arguing persuasively that the Commonwealth and Wellpath had an obligation to reasonably accommodate his disabilities and that its repeated failure to do so was the reason he could not meaningfully access various prison services. The duty to accommodate is triggered when a disabled person’s need for an accommodation becomes known, either because (1) he requests an accommodation or (2) his disability and concomitant need for an accommodation are open and apparent. See Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 330 (3d Cir. 2001); Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1197-98(10th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). Here, once Montanez suddenly became paralyzed, his disability and resulting limitations were obvious to prison staff, including Dr. Mahli and Nurse Wagman. And during his second stint at FCI-Huntingdon, his accommodation requests, including for mobility aids and a double mattress or other bedding accommodations, “were repeatedly refused.” Durham, 82 F.4th at 226.So the Commonwealth and Wellpath had an affirmative duty to accommodate Montanez, and its failure to do so was “tantamount to denying [him] access” to those prison services “on the same basis as other inmates.”
In sum, a prison’s “toilets, beds, and medical care are a ‘service’” or program under Title II and Section 504, and Montanez has adequately pleaded that he was denied access to all three by reason of his disability. Hall, 77 F.4th at 1181.The Complaint therefore states a Title II and Section 504 claim against the Commonwealth and a Section 504 claim against Wellpath, and the dismissal of those claims was error.
To recover compensatory damages for a Section 504 or Title II violation, a plaintiff must plead, in addition to the elements of a prima facie case, that the discrimination was “intentional” in the sense that it was more than mere disparate impact. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference satisfies this requirement, which, in the disability law context, consists of (1) knowledge that the plaintiff’s federally protected right to be free from disability discrimination was likely to be violated, and (2) “failure to act despite that knowledge.” Id. at 263-65 (emphasis omitted); see also Furgess, 933 F.3d at 292.
Montanez’s Complaint sufficiently pleads that various prison, and medical staff had the requisite knowledge yet failed to act.
The Commonwealth contends that it cannot be liable for any Title II and Section 504 violations of the Medical Defendants because they are contractors, not government employees. But that misapprehends the reach of those remedial statutes. As our sister circuits have consistently recognized and as we hold today, both their text and purpose confirm the Commonwealth’s obligation to ensure compliance with Title II and Section 504 even when it contracts out the operation of their programs, services, or activities to third parties.
In short, whether they use contractors, states remain responsible for ensuring that disabled prisoners can access their prisons’ services, programs, and activities on the same basis as non-disabled prisoners. See Williams, 117 F.4th at 548.13 And as applied here, that means the Commonwealth was “obligated to ensure that [Wellpath and its employees]—like all other State contractors—complie[d] with federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.” Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2013). It was therefore error for the District Court to dismiss the ADA and RA claims against the Commonwealth and the RA claim against Wellpath. Those claims, including Montanez’s request for compensatory damages, survive the motions to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs courts to grant motions for leave to amend “when justice so requires.” So, leave to amend should be liberally given unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And because courts have a special obligation to be “more forgiving of pro se litigants,” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019), this Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing pro se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the court rules upon defendants’ motions to dismiss,” Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). Despite correctly reciting this standard, the District Court nonetheless denied Montanez’s request for leave to amend, concluding that amendment [*34] “would be futile based on the factual and legal defects” in Montanez’s Complaint. Montanez, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148643, 2023 WL 5435616, at *11. This was an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, denying Montanez leave to amend was an abuse of discretion and should be corrected on remand.
Pro se complaints—however inartfully pleaded—must be carefully considered, for while prisoners surrender many liberties upon conviction, the right to access the courts and seek redress for constitutional and statutory violations is not one of them. We will therefore (1) reverse the District Court’s dismissal of Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Mahli, Nurse Wagman, and Administrator Ellers, the Title II and Section 504 claims against the Commonwealth, and the Section 504 claim against Wellpath; (2) affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims against the Commonwealth and Individual Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacities, the disability law claims against the Individual Commonwealth and Medical Defendants, and the ADA claim against Wellpath; and (3) remand with instructions to permit Montanez to amend his Complaint.
