CIVIL RIGHTS – SEX AND RACIST CRIMINATION – APPEAL – EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES – STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – HEARSAY – 1981 CLAIM

Jones v. Foods on First III Inc., 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 386 (August 26, 2025) Bowes, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.:
Foods on First III, Inc., d/b/a Foods on First; Foods on First VI, Inc., d/b/a Foods on First; Manuel Salazar; and Aldo Salazar (collectively “Defendants”) appeal from the judgment finding in favor of Najaea Jones (“Plaintiff”) with respect to her employment discrimination claims. We affirm.
We glean the following from the certified record. On April 29, 2017, Plaintiff, who is Black, began working at the restaurant operated by Defendants in Philadelphia called Foods on First. Her duties primarily consisted of answering telephones and preparing pick-up food orders. Plaintiff was hired by Aldo Salazar,1 and managed both by him and his brother, Manuel Salazar. Aldo and Manuel Salazar owned the business together. Plaintiff was paid hourly in cash. Her hours fluctuated based on the needs of the restaurant but were later found by the court to average approximately forty-one and one-half hours per week.
Plaintiff contended that she was subject to multiple instances of sexual harassment during her employment.
Plaintiff also averred that she suffered race-based discrimination during her employment.
Plaintiff contended that on July 26, 2017, approximately two months after she began working for Defendants, Manuel Salazar asked her to clean a large ten-foot wall.
Plaintiff’s mother later sent a facsimile to the business expressing her anger at how Plaintiff was treated, and which Defendants believed was an expression of Plaintiff’s determination to quit.
Roughly two months later, Plaintiff obtained a job at Five Below, which she left after eight weeks, alleging poor treatment from her supervisor and coworkers. She fell into a depression and did not obtain employment again until July 2019. Plaintiff treated with a therapist for five or six months during the period to address her depression.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court here did not err in rejecting Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her PFPO claims. Although not binding on this Court, we find the thorough and well-reasoned analysis provided by the district court in Higgins persuasive and therefore hold that the PFPO does not require a complainant to file a complaint with the Philadelphia Commission prior to filing a suit in state court if a submission relating to the same conduct has been made with the PHRC. Unlike the court in Lee, we do not interpret § 9-1112(1) of the PFPO as imposing a requirement that a complaint must be sent to the Philadelphia Commission before filing a civil complaint, but rather as setting forth the procedures for initiating a complaint with the Philadelphia Commission if that particular remedy is sought. Since Plaintiff here followed the proper channels pursuant to the PHRA, and her filing there related to the same conduct included in her PFPO counts, she was not required to submit a redundant filing to the Commission. No relief is due.
The case has gone through trial and the court considered evidence as to the race discrimination count. We have held that “a trial court’s denial of a fact-dependent pre[-]trial [motion for summary judgment] is not reviewable when the issue was subsequently resolved at trial.” Coryell v. Morris, 2025 PA Super 28, 330 A.3d 1270, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2025) (en banc). In this vein, Coryell affirmed the same holding in Xtreme Caged Combat v. Zarro, 2021 PA Super 29, 247 A.3d 42 (Pa.Super. 2021), wherein this Court stated: [W]here, as here, a summary judgment motion is based on the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the plaintiff’s claims, once a case goes to trial and evidence is presented at trial, the denial of summary judgment is moot and the sufficiency of the evidence must be analyzed based on the trial record. Id. at 50-51. Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of her race discrimination claim is necessarily fact-dependent, and the evidence as to the claim was presented at trial. Thus, the issue concerning the trial court’s failure to dispose of the motion for summary judgment is moot.
We find no abuse of discretion with the court’s decision to permit evidence of Plaintiff’s hours as recorded within her journal. The document satisfied all elements of Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) in that Plaintiff once knew the shifts she worked but could not recall them as of the time of trial, she had prepared the notes contemporaneously with when she worked, and they reflected her knowledge at the time made. Moreover, the trial court found that it could reconcile the mathematical errors by adopting the start and stop times of each shift logged by Plaintiff, rather than depending upon her faulty addition. This in turn provided a basis for the court’s ultimate award of damages to Plaintiff. Since the court did not err in admitting or relying upon this evidence, this issue fails.
As far as intervening causes for damages are concerned, the trial court considered the fact that Plaintiff sought treatment for depression following her termination in calculating the damages to which Plaintiff was entitled. It specifically “did not find the employment [at Five Below] to be an intervening cause of the Plaintiff’s damages,” even though Plaintiff testified to having a negative term of employment there. It concluded rather that “the experience of working for the [Salazars] caused [Plaintiff’s] mental anguish, humiliation, distress[,] and loss of dignity” that required treatment with a therapist for six months. The court also properly deducted the period of time Plaintiff worked at Five Below from the award of damages. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to overcome this challenge set forth by Defendants. This is especially true in light of Defendants’ scant argument as to this point, which, although citing the record to establish its factual position, did not identify any legal authority discussing intervening causes, how they affect the award of damages, or the like. It is not the duty of this Court to develop a party’s arguments. See Kalili v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 2024 PA Super 311, 330 A.3d 396, 406 (Pa.Super. 2024) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”).
Plaintiff’s proposed findings were extremely thorough and addressed all the issues raised in this appeal, including the legal questions reasserted in Defendants’ post-trial motion and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each count. The fact that the trial court accepted those findings as written did not by itself make its decision arbitrary. See, e.g., Guiser v. Sieber, 2020 PA Super 182, 237 A.3d 496, 499 (Pa.Super. 2000) (reiterating the principle that “it is not error for the trial court to adopt a party’s proposed findings of fact and/or conclusions of law”). Additionally, Defendants cite no legal authority supporting their contention that they are entitled to either reversal of the judgment or a new trial based on that position. Moreover, to the extent the trial court did not initially address in writing its rationale underlying the claims implicating its discretion, the court dutifully complied with this Court’s directive and submitted a supplemental memorandum opinion speaking to these issues.
In sum, we have no cause to disturb the trial court’s judgment order entered in favor of Plaintiff in this case. Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered.