Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 145 S. Ct. 2219 (June 26, 2025) Gorsuch, J.
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
Medicaid offers States “a bargain.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 323 (2015). In return for federal funds, States agree “to spend them in accordance with congressionally imposed conditions.” Ibid. Should a State fail to comply substantially with those conditions, the Secretary of Health and Human Services can withhold some or all its federal Medicaid funding. This case poses the question whether, in addition to that remedy, individual Medicaid beneficiaries may sue state officials for failing to comply with one funding condition spelled out in 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(23)(A).
To resolve the circuits’ disagreement and address our lower court colleagues’ calls for clarification, we begin by outlining how to determine whether a statute confers an individually enforceable right under §1983.
Historically, individuals brought §1983 suits to vindicate rights protected by the Constitution. But, in 1980, this Court recognized that §1983 also authorizes private parties to pursue violations of their federal statutory rights. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1. Still, this Court has emphasized, statutes create individual rights only in “atypical case[s].” Talevski, 599 U. S., at 183. Routinely, of course, federal legislation seeks to benefit one group or another. (Why pass legislation otherwise?) But §1983 provides a cause of action “only for the deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ ” not “ ‘benefits’ or ‘interests.’ ” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 283.
To prove that a statute secures an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity, and does not just provide a benefit or protect an interest, a plaintiff must show that the law in question “clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]” uses “rights- creating terms.” Id., at 284, 290. In addition, the statute must display “ ‘an unmistakable focus’ ” on individuals like the plaintiff. Id., at 284 (emphasis deleted); accord, Talevski, 599 U. S., at 183. We have described this as a “stringent” and “demanding” test. Id., at 180, 186; accord, post, at 9 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing Gonzaga as setting forth “a restrictive test”). And even for the rare statute that satisfies it, this Court has said, a §1983 action still may not be available if Congress has displaced §1983’s general cause of action with a more specific remedy. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005).
With these principles in hand, we turn to the question whether the plaintiffs before us may maintain a §1983 suit to enforce Medicaid’s any-qualified-provider provision. To succeed, they must show, at a minimum, that §1396a(a)(23)(A) does not just seek to benefit them or serve their interests but “clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]” gives them individual federal rights. Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 290.
Section 1983 permits private plaintiffs to sue for violations of federal spending-power statutes only in “atypical” situations, Talevski, 599 U. S., at 183, where the provision in question “clear[ly]” and “unambiguous[ly]” confers an individual “right,” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 290. Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) is not such a statute. Because the Fourth Circuit concluded otherwise, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
