A.A.R.P., et al. v. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., 2025 U.S. LEXIS 1837, decided (U.S. Supreme Ct., May 16, 2025) (Kavanaugh, J.)
The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), Rev. Stat. §4067, 50 U. S. C. §21, to remove Venezuelan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. See Presidential Proclamation No. 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033 (2025). Applicants are two detainees identified as members of TdA and a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas. All of the alleged TdA members in the putative class are currently being held in U. S. detention facilities. In the application before the Court, the detainees seek injunctive relief against summary removal under the AEA.
The Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders that have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84, 101 S. Ct. 993, 67 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981). A district court’s inaction in the face of extreme urgency and a high risk of “serious, perhaps irreparable,” consequences may have the effect of refusing an injunction. 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3924.1, pp. 174, 180-181 (3d ed. 2012) (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176, 181, 75 S. Ct. 249, 99 L. Ed. 233 (1955)). Here the District Court’s inaction—not for 42 minutes but for 14 hours and 28 minutes—had the practical effect of refusing an injunction to detainees facing an imminent threat of severe, irreparable harm. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. “[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 221 L. Ed. 2d 529, 532 (2025) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect” against “the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 259, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978). We have long held that “no person shall be” removed from the United States “without opportunity, at some time, to be heard.” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101, 23 S. Ct. 611, 47 L. Ed. 721 (1903). Due process requires notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties” and that “afford[s] a reasonable time . . . to make [an] appearance.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950). Accordingly, in J. G. G., this Court explained—with all nine Justices agreeing—that “AEA detainees must receive notice . . . that they are subject to removal under the Act . . . within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief ” before removal. 604 U. S., 45 S. Ct. 1003, 221 L. Ed. 2d 529, 532. In order to “actually seek habeas relief,” a detainee must have sufficient time and information to reasonably be able to contact counsel, file a petition, and pursue appropriate relief.
The application for an injunction pending further proceedings is granted. The motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix under seal is also granted. Additionally, applicants suggested this Court treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari; doing so, the petition is granted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Fifth Circuit. In resolving the detainees’ appeal, the Fifth Circuit should address (1) all the normal preliminary injunction factors, including likelihood of success on the merits, as to the named plaintiffs’ underlying habeas claims that the AEA does not authorize their removal pursuant to the President’s March 14, 2025, Proclamation, and (2) the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class’s due process claims against summary removal. The Government is enjoined from removing the named plaintiffs or putative class members in this action under the AEA pending order by the Fifth Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court. The Government may remove the named plaintiffs or putative class members under other lawful authorities. It is so ordered. Concur by: KAVANAUGH
