N.N. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2025 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 218 (December 26, 2025) Wallace, J.
Judges: BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge.
The School District of Philadelphia, Sandra Williamson, and David Johnson (collectively, the District) appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County’s (trial court) order entered March 25, 2024 (Order), which denied the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion). In its Motion, the District sought summary judgment on the basis that it had governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542. The trial court denied the District’s Motion based on the sexual abuse exception to immunity set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9) (sexual abuse exception). After review, we affirm.
According to the Complaint, on March 10, 2020, K.W. rode the bus home from school seated with another minor male student. K.W. and the minor male student sat directly behind the Bus Attendant, and five rows away from the Bus Driver. The Bus Attendant spent the bus ride on a personal telephone call on her cellular phone. During this bus ride, the minor male student is alleged to have sexually assaulted K.W. for approximately 22 minutes, all of which was videorecorded.
In West on behalf of S.W. v. Pittsburgh Public Schools, 327 A.3d 340, 343 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024), this Court addressed whether a trial court’s order overruling a school district’s preliminary objection concluding it was not entitled to governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act was immediately appealable as a collateral order. Citing Brooks, this Court noted “adverse orders on the issue of governmental immunity are immediately reviewable as collateral orders because the entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Although we acknowledge Brooks differs from the case before us in that Brooks involved sovereign immunity and the case here involves governmental immunity, we nevertheless find Brooks instructive.
We conclude, consistent with this Court’s decision in West, the District’s governmental immunity defense would be irreparably lost if the case went to final judgment. Because all three prongs under Rule 313 are satisfied, we conclude this matter involves a collateral order appealable as of right. Accordingly, we will address the merits of the District’s appeal.
On appeal to this Court, the school district, relying on Section 8541, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, argued it was immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act because a third party, and not the school district or its employees, is alleged to have committed the sexual abuse. Id. at 401. The school district contended its immunity could only be abrogated if a school district employee committed the abuse. Id. In response, the student maintained the school district’s liability arose from its negligence in enabling the sexual abuse to occur, rather than the sexual abuse itself. Id. at 405. Agreeing with the student, this Court noted the intent of the legislation was to hold municipalities, like the school district, “accountable for negligently enabling sexual abuse.” Id. at 411 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this Court rejected the school district’s arguments and affirmed the trial court’s order that overruled the school district’s preliminary objections.
Here, the District argues the trial court erred by concluding “student-on-student sexual abuse” abrogates its immunity under the sexual abuse exception to the Torts Claim Act where the Tort Claims Act expressly immunizes local agencies, like the District, and their employees, from liability for acts committed by third parties. Given our holding in L.F.V., we cannot agree. In L.F.V., we held the sexual abuse exception to the general rule of governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act applies where a local agency is accused of negligently enabling sexual abuse. In other words, for the sexual abuse exception to apply, there need not be an allegation that the local agency or one of its employees committed one of the enumerated acts. Rather, the sexual abuse exception applies if there is an allegation that the local agency negligently enabled the sexual abuse to occur. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion or legal error in the trial court’s Order denying the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court properly concluded the sexual abuse exception to the Tort Claims Act is applicable where a local agency is accused of negligently enabling sexual abuse, and, therefore, it properly denied the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s Order.
• Student sexually abused on bus.
• School district claimed that sexual abuse exception to Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act immunity did not apply.
• The Court found that this was a collateral order but that it was appealable by the school district of Philadelphia.
• The Court ruled that under the Tort Claims Act the student can bring the action.
• The district argued the trial court erred by concluding “student-on-student sexual abuse” abrogates its immunity under the sexual abuse exception.
• The Commonwealth Court did not agree. In the L.F.V. case, the court held that sexual abuse exception to general rule of governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act applies to a local agency who is accused of negligently enabling sexual abuse.
• Here there was a claim of such enablement and therefore, there was no abuse of discretion and the trial court denying the district’s motion for summary judgment.
