Edwards v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 212
(May 13, 2025) Lazarus, P.J.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk”) appeals by permission1 from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying its motion for summary judgment. Upon review, we affirm.
Douglas A. Edwards (“Decedent”) was employed by Norfolk as a brakeman, conductor, and locomotive engineer from 1989 to 2010. Decedent was subsequently diagnosed with renal cell cancer, allegedly as a result of on-the-job exposure to various toxic substances; he died on October 27, 2015. On October 26, 2018, with one day left before the statute of limitations expired, Appellee Denia Edwards (“Edwards”), Decedent’s wife, filed an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, alleging that Decedent’s cancer was caused by his two-decade-plus employment with Norfolk. The complaint identified the plaintiff as “DENIA EDWARDS, Personal Representative for the Estate of DOUGLAS A. EDWARDS.” At the time, however, Edwards had neither applied to be, nor been appointed as, the personal representative of Decedent’s estate, even though she was named as executrix of his will. On December 27, 2018, two months after the statute of limitations for a FELA action had run, Edwards applied to be the personal representative of Decedent’s estate in Mercer County, West Virginia, where she and Decedent lived.
At issue in this matter is the application of the “relation back” doctrine. Generally, “all actions that survive a decedent must be brought by or against the personal representative” and “a decedent’s estate cannot be a party to litigation unless a personal representative exists.” Salvadia v. Ashbrook, 2007 PA Super 108, 923 A.2d 436, 440 (Pa. Super. 2007) The relation back doctrine, however, will sometimes be applied as an exception to the general rule.
Simply stated, the doctrine of relation back as applied to cases where an estate is a party means that the courts under certain circumstances will validate the acts of the personal representative of the estate which preceded the date of [her] official appointment. Thus, where a plaintiff, acting as the personal representative of an estate, initiates an action before the statute of limitations has run, but also before [] her appointment as personal representative has been finalized, the doctrine of relation back may be applied in appropriate circumstances to validate the filing of the action, even though the plaintiff’s appointment is not finalized until after the limitations period has expired.
Prevish v. Northwest Med. Ctr. Oil City Campus, 692 A.2d 192, 201 (Pa. Super. 1997)
After careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment and applying the relation back doctrine in this case. First, as we did in McGuire, we begin with the purpose of statutes of limitations to determine whether the relation back doctrine can be applied under these circumstances. Statutes of limitations “serve several purposes: imposing finality on the litigation system; providing defendants with an end to their potential liability; and avoiding litigation of disputes involving stale evidence.” Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 661 Pa. 638, 237 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. 2020). As this Court has long recognized, the “purpose of any statute of limitations is to expedite litigation and thus discourage delay and the presentation of stale claims which may greatly prejudice the defense of such claims.” McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia, 585 Pa. 211, 222, 888 A.2d 664 (Pa. 2005)
Edwards timely filed her FELA action and set out all the elements of her claims before the statute of limitations had run, thus notifying Norfolk that it was a named defendant in a lawsuit and providing the alleged basis for Norfolk’s liability. Critically, just as the Lesho court recognized, the plaintiff’s claims did not change because of Edwards’ subsequent formal appointment as personal representative. See Lesho, 435 A.2d at 1343 (“Absolutely nothing was changed in the [plaintiffs’] complaint by virtue of letters of administration having been granted to them after the statute of limitations had run.”).
Second, in each of the four cases reviewed above, the complaint listed the plaintiff as the personal representative of the estate in the caption or alleged that the plaintiff was the administrator or administratrix of the estate. See McGuire, 385 A.2d at 467; D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 551; Gasbarini, 409 A.2d at 345; Lesho, 435 A.2d at 1341. Likewise here, in both her original and amended complaints, Edwards listed the plaintiff in the caption as “DENIA EDWARDS, Personal Representative for the Estate of DOUGLAS A. EDWARDS.” Further, she averred in both complaints that she was the personal representative of the estate. As a result, although Edwards had not yet applied to be the personal representative of the estate, the complaint put Norfolk on notice that she was bringing the action in her capacity as personal representative of the estate and identified the claims she would bring.
We read nothing in McGuire, D’Orazio, or Gasbarini as precluding the conclusion that the trial court reached in this case. Edwards was named the executor in Decedent’s will and timely filed her FELA action, in which she averred that she was the personal representative of Decedent’s estate. Like the defendants in McGuire, D’Orazio, Gasbarini, and Lesho, Norfolk was put on notice before the statute of limitations had expired that an action had been filed against it by a plaintiff “who was, at least putatively, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.” Prevish, 692 A.2d at 204. While it may be preferable that a plaintiff seek appointment before the statute runs, we do not find that the failure to do so compels dismissal of a complaint when the plaintiff is the named executor and avers that she is the personal representative in a timely-filed complaint.
Order affirmed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judges Bowes, Dubow, Kunselman, Nichols, King and Lane join this Opinion. Judge
Stabile files a Dissenting Opinion in which Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
• The trial court reached the correct conclusion in this case.
• Edwards was named the executor in the decedent’s will and timely filed her FELA action, in which averred that she was the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.
• Like defendants in McGuire, D’Orazio, Gasbarini, and Lesho, Norfolk was put on notice before the statute of limitations had expired. The action had been filed against them by a plaintiff “who was, at least punitively the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.” Prevish, 692 A.2d at 204.
• It would have been preferable if the plaintiff could seek appointment before the statute ran, but the court did not find the failure to do so compels dismissal of the complaint when the plaintiff is named the executor and avers that she is the personal representative in a timely-filed complaint.
• Two months after the statute of limitations for a FELA action had passed, Edwards applied to be personal representative of the decedent’s estate, in Mercer County, West Virginia where she and the decedent lived.
• However, on October 26, 2018, one day left before the statute of limitations expired, Edwards filed an action under FELA.
