Hagans v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 302 (July 10, 2025) McLaughlin, J.
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (“HUP”) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Dajah Hagans (“Plaintiff” or “D.H.”), as parent and natural guardian of J.H., and against it. HUP alleges the trial court erred in its denial of HUP’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), in certain evidentiary rulings, and in its rulings related to the verdict slip. HUP also claims the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the court erred in not granting remittitur. We affirm.
In February 2018, D.H. was pregnant with J.H. Her water broke around 11:30 a.m. on February 22, 2018, and an ambulance took her to HUP. Within three hours of arrival, D.H. gave birth to J.H. by cesarean section (“Csection”). J.H. had a brain injury at birth, and was moved to intensive care and then transferred to Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (“CHOP”).
The jury found against HUP and in Plaintiff’s favor. The jury awarded $182,737,791.00 in damages. HUP filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied. Following the award of delay damages, Plaintiff entered judgment against HUP for $207,628.10. HUP timely appealed.
We agree with the trial court. Plaintiff was required to establish that HUP’s agents acted negligently. She did that through the expert testimony and other evidence presented. The jury did not need to make an express finding as to each individual defendant, particularly where HUP focused its argument and testimony on how the employees worked as a team. Furthermore, as set forth by the trial court and explained above, Plaintiff admitted testimony as to the standard of care for individual employees and how the breaches of the standards caused harm to J.H.
To supports its claim that a verdict as to the Individual Defendants was required, HUP relies on cases where a jury found the agent not negligent or on cases that state a general proposition that an employer cannot be vicariously liable unless there is a cause of action against an employee. See, e.g., Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Serv., Inc., 2012 PA Super 255, 59 A.3d 621, 638 (Pa.Super. 2012)(employer not liable where agent found not negligent); Skalos v. Higgins, 303 Pa. Super. 107, 449 A.2d 601, 603-04 (Pa.Super. 1982) ( “Where the master is joined with his servant in an action based wholly on the servant’s negligence or misconduct, the master cannot be held liable unless there is a cause of action against the servant”). Here, Plaintiff was required to establish the liability of HUP’s employees to establish HUP was vicariously liable, and she did so. HUP’s liability was based on the actions of its employees.
The court did not abuse its discretion. The verdict slip had the individual providers’ names on it, and, through its verdict, the jury found that at least one of the Individual Defendants was negligent and that the negligence caused harm. The jury reached its verdict after hearing evidence that the Individual Defendants had deviated from standards of care and harmed J.H., and after being properly instructed on the elements of medical malpractice and vicarious liability. We perceive no error, and even if there was one, it was at most harmless.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. We conclude that, even if the trial court erred when it included increased risk of harm on the verdict slip, the error was harmless. The trial court properly instructed the jury, including an instruction that a finding of increased risk of harm can be a sufficient basis from which the jury could find the negligence was a factual cause of the injury. The instructions clearly set forth the law for the jury. The verdict slip, as a whole and in context, was sufficiently clear and did not confuse the jury, and was at most harmless error.
This was not an abuse of discretion. The cord blood sample was extracted after birth, and it would not have impacted Dr. Leitner’s decisions regarding D.H.’s care before birth. Furthermore, Dr. Leitner’s testimony would have been cumulative of the defense expert testimony, and therefore, HUP has not established it was prejudiced by the preclusion of her testimony.
Insofar as HUP attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, as above, the evidence supported the verdict finding HUP vicariously liable for negligence. The remainder of HUP’s argument improperly asks this Court to reassess credibility and weight. That is not a proper basis for finding a verdict against the weight of the evidence, let alone for finding an abuse of discretion in rejecting a weight challenge.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the verdict on future medical expenses was not against the weight of the evidence. The jury was presented evidence on the cost of the care J.H. requires and presented with life expectancy tables and J.H.’s life expectancy, and based its award on the evidence presented, concluding J.H. had a life expectancy of 70 years of age. The award does not shock the conscience.
HUP next maintains the weight of the evidence did not support the pain and suffering award of $80 million. It maintains that its expert testified that “due to J.H.’s limited brain function, J.H. ‘has a limited ability to interpret’ pain” and that Plaintiff presented no evidence to counter this testimony. HUP maintains the Plaintiff did not present evidence to establish the degree to which J.H. can experience physical or emotional pain. It maintains that D.H. is not competent to testify about the “complex medical issues,” and that her testimony, such as the testimony J.H. makes noises when hungry, “is not empirical or medical evidence that in any way substantiates his actual brain function or cognitive abilities, or establishes that he appreciates his current state.” It further maintains the jury should not have awarded anything based on D.H.’s, rather than J.H.’s, loss.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiff admitted evidence of J.H.’s pain and suffering, which the jury credited. The trial court acted within the range of its discretion in finding that the award does not shock the conscience.
Although large, it was based on the facts of the case, and the evidence supports it. The trial court properly concluded that the award does not shock the conscience.
HUP next maintains the court erred in not holding a hearing to consider the effect of the verdict on access to health care in the community. It argues the MCARE statute provides the court “shall” consider evidence of impact on the availability of access to healthcare in the community when a verdict is challenged on excessiveness grounds. It claims a hearing would only have discussed the impact on access to healthcare and would have provided the opportunity to present the evidence the court claimed it lacked.
Under MCARE, a trial court must “consider evidence of the impact” of the verdict upon the availability or access to healthcare in the community.
The trial court concluded that MCARE did not require an evidentiary hearing. It pointed out that HUP requested the production of expert reports and an evidentiary hearing where testimony from the experts and declarants could be heard. The court concluded that the post-trial motions and the lengthy oral argument gave it sufficient information on which to base its decision on remittitur. It reasoned “[a] protracted discovery process, and trial within a trial would unduly impact judicial resources and place an undue burden of time and expense on Plaintiff.”
We find no error. MCARE requires that trial courts consider evidence on impact in the community but does not mandate an evidentiary hearing. Here, HUP presented declarations in support of its position, which the trial court considered when denying the motion.
As outlined above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the award does not shock the conscience. No relief is due.
Judgment affirmed. Judge Lane joins the opinion. Judge Stabile concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
