Skip to main content

NEGLIGENCE – BUSES – JERK & JOLT DOCTRINE – COMMON CARRIERS

Musser v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 2026 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 28 (February 27, 2026) Christine Fizzano Cannon, Judge.
Plaintiff claims that she fell while on a SEPTA bus in Philadelphia. She testified that she was seating herself in one of the side-facing seats in the front of the bus and was “almost in the seat” when the bus restarted. She said it felt like the bus went off to the left a little bit and she was thrown to the floor. She characterized the motion of the bus in restarting as “aggressive.” There was contrary evidence at trial, including video of the incident.
Musser’s legal theory of liability was a negligence doctrine known as the jerk and jolt doctrine, under which a common carrier, such as SEPTA, may be liable for negligence that causes an injury to a bus passenger who falls because the bus experiences a sudden, unusual, or extraordinary jerk or jolt. However, and of relevance in this appeal, merely restarting a bus before a boarding passenger is seated is not negligence in the absence of such a jerk or jolt, unless the passenger has requested that the driver wait until the passenger is seated. See Asbury v. Port Auth. Transit, 863 A.2d 84 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Here, Musser’s allegation was not that the bus should have waited until she was seated before moving, but rather, that the restart constituted a sudden, unusual, or extraordinary jerk or jolt that caused her to fall.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court gave a standard jury instruction explaining the jerk and jolt doctrine. SEPTA requested an addition to that instruction advising the jury that restarting a bus before a passenger is seated is not negligence unless the passenger has asked the driver to wait. The Trial Court gave the additional instruction over Musser’s objection.
The jury returned a verdict finding that both parties were negligent, attributing 26% fault to SEPTA and 74% fault to Musser.
The Trial Court in this action gave the standard jury instruction and also, at SEPTA’s request, instructed the jury that a bus driver is not required to wait until an entering passenger is seated before restarting the bus unless requested by the passenger to do so. Musser insists this instruction was an abuse of discretion because the standard instruction covered the jerk and jolt doctrine fully and the driver’s failure to wait until Musser was seated before restarting the bus was not raised as a basis of liability. Musser posits that including this expanded instruction potentially confused the jury by implicitly suggesting that the case could be decided on the basis that the driver was not required to wait until Musser was seated, before restarting the bus. We discern no merit in this argument.
Musser asserts that a trial court is not required to give a non-standard jury instruction requested by a party where the standard suggested jury instruction states the law fully and accurately. Although this statement is true, it does not support Musser’s argument that the Trial Court here, was, in effect, not permitted to add the requested language to its jury instruction, such that it abused its discretion by doing so. Musser cites no authority supporting such a proposition.
Notably, the Subcommittee Note to SSJI § 13.130 specifically includes a comment relevant to the situation that occurred here, pointing to a case in which “the court found the evidence insufficient to demonstrate an extraordinary stop or jerk where the driver started up the bus before the plaintiff was seated and the plaintiff had not asked the driver to wait until she was seated . . . .” SSJI § 13.130 (citing Asbury, 863 A.2d at 84). The drafting subcommittee evidently found it important to clarify that restarting a bus before a passenger was seated, without more, was insufficient to satisfy the jerk and jolt doctrine. We agree with that view.
We conclude that the Trial Court here did not abuse its discretion by clarifying in its jury instructions the legal principle that merely restarting a bus before a boarding passenger is fully seated is not negligence.
• The Jolt and Jerk Doctrine applies in bus cases.
• The Standard Jury Instruction given does not mean that the court cannot add something extra which is relevant and appropriate.
• Here, the Court added that the bus could start while a person was still walking in it, unless the bus driver was asked not to start.
• This actually was covered by SSJI § 13.130 which specifically includes a comment relevant to the situation.
• The draft and subcommittee found it important to clarify that restarting a bus before a passenger was seated, without more, was insufficient to satisfy the jerk and jolt doctrine.
• The Commonwealth agreed with that point of view.