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South Bethlehem Assocs., LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bethlehem Twp., 2023 Pa. LEXIS 683 (S. Ct. May 16, 2023) (Mundy, J.). In this discretionary appeal, a local zoning board granted a request for variances needed by a property owner to build a hotel on the subject property. The owner of a competing hotel, who opposed the grant of such relief, was permitted to appear before the board, cross examine witnesses, and provide oral argument. The question presented is whether that party had standing to seek judicial review of the board’s subsequent ruling. We granted allocatur limited to whether the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that Appellant lacked standing [*6] to seek judicial review. See S. Bethlehem Assocs. v. ZHB of Bethlehem Twp., 275 A.3d 484 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam). Ordinarily, standing to initiate judicial proceedings depends on the litigant being adversely affected in some way. See Wm. Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (Pa. 1975). To assess whether a litigant is affected in a manner the law recognizes, courts “consider whether the litigant has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the matter.” Markham v. Wolf, 635 Pa. 288, 136 A.3d 134, 140 (Pa. 2016). This occurs when “the party’s interest surpasses that of the general public in procuring obedience to the law, the harm alleged was caused by the matter complained of, and the harm is not remote and speculative.” In re Trust under Will of Ashton, 260 A.3d 81, 88 (Pa. 2021). The same is not necessarily true of local administrative proceedings. Section 908(3) of the MPC indicates standing to appear before a local zoning board considering an application for a variance, and to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses in relation to the application, is broader than aggrieved-person standing as outlined above. In sum, then, we hold that a party who appears before a zoning board may only appeal an adverse decision to court if that party has standing per this Court’s traditional understanding of the concept. Such is consistent with our decision in Hickson, where Rule of Criminal Procedure 506 (then-Rule 106) was silent with regard to a citizen’s standing to seek judicial review of prosecutorial inaction on a private criminal complaint. We held that such silence did not negate the ordinary requirement of standing to institute judicial proceedings. See Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243. Further, we find in this matter that Appellant lacked standing to appeal, as its only interest affected by the zoning board’s ruling was its desire to suppress competition in the open market. The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.