Gidor v. Mangus, 2025 Pa. LEXIS 1711 (October 23, 2025) Donohue, J.
Judges: TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ. JUSTICE DONOHUE. Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion. Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.
Opinion by: DONOHUE
In this case we are asked to determine whether 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512 (“Section 7512”) of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations. Section 7512 provides:
§ 7512. Statute of limitations.
An action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered.
68 Pa.C.S. § 7512.
We find the plain language of Section 7512 creates a statute of repose. Accordingly, a plaintiff who does not bring “[a]n action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report … within one year after the date the report is delivered[,]” is barred from doing so, regardless of when the claim accrues. See id. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
In May 2017, Appellant Mary Joan Gidor (“Gidor”) entered into an agreement to purchase a home (the “Property”) in Titusville, Pennsylvania. Prior to completing the purchase, Gidor orally agreed with Appellee Benjamin E. Mangus (“Mangus”) that he would perform a home inspection of the Property. On June 6, 2017, Mangus delivered to Gidor his home inspection report (“Inspection Report”) for the Property, which did not disclose any problems with the Property’s structural components or foundation. On July 31, 2017, based on “Mangus’ representations in the Inspection Report,” Gidor purchased the Property.
During the winter of 2018-2019, a water pipe in the Property froze and burst beneath the primary bathroom. A plumber repaired the pipe and discovered that the addition to the Property was built without a foundation over bare ground supported only by wooden posts. According to Gidor, the lack of foundation exposed the bathroom pipes to the elements, which caused the pipes to freeze and burst. She also discovered that the vinyl ductwork on the Property was not rated for exterior use, which allowed animals to chew through it, leading to infestation on the Property.
We find that the text of Section 7512 is plain and unambiguous in commanding that “[a]n action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered.” 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512. To determine whether Section 7512 is a statute of limitations or repose, we must read it in the context of our case law interpreting other statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. This approach is consistent with how this Court has analyzed whether other plain and unambiguous statutes are either statutes of limitations or statutes of repose. See Dubose, 173 A.3d at 647 (discussing the characteristics of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose to define “the plain language of Section 513(d)” as being a statute of limitations); City of Phila. v. City of Phila. Tax Rev. Bd. ex rel. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 635 Pa. 108, 132 A.3d 946, 953 (Pa. 2015) (relying on our discussion in Abrams that “a statute of repose delineates a defined time that begins with a definitely established event, independent of the injury or its discovery” to conclude that the plain language of Section 19-1703(1)(d) of the Philadelphia Code is a statute of repose); Vargo, 715 A.2d at 425-26 (interpreting the plain language of the Construction Statute of Repose to be a statute of repose based on precedent from this Court and the Commonwealth Court). Therefore, we turn to the legal principles fundamental to both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose to determine whether Section 7512 is a statute of limitations, or repose.
A statute of limitations limits the time for a plaintiff to bring suit based on when a cause of action accrues. Vargo, 715 A.2d at 425. A cause of action accrues “when an injury is inflicted and the corresponding right to institute a suit for damages arises.” Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 609 Pa. 353, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). While a statute of repose also limits the time for a plaintiff to bring suit, unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose “‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action” because “the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.” Abrams, 981 A.2d at 211 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Where a limitations period begins with a definitely established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the statute is considered to be one of repose.” City of Phila., 132 A.3d at 952 (citing Abrams, 981 A.2d at 211 (explaining that “the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted”)); see also Altoona Area Sch. Dist. v. Campbell, 152 Pa. Commw. 131, 618 A.2d 1129, 1134 (Pa. Commw. 1992) (noting that “statutes of limitation begin to run from the time of an injurious occurrence or discovery of the same, … whereas statutes of repose run for a statutorily determined period of time after a definitively established event independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery of the same”). Importantly, a statute of repose “completely abolishes and eliminates [a] cause of action” regardless of when the claim accrues and, in some cases, even before the claim accrues. Vargo, 715 A.2d at 425 (citing Noll, 643 A.2d at 84).
Conversely, because statutes of repose not only bar a party’s right to a remedy, but abolish and eliminate a cause of action entirely, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations. See Noll, 643 A.2d at 84. There simply is no action to toll once a repose period lapses.
Gidor’s argument that a statute of repose requires that the triggering occurrence be an act of the defendant is belied by our case law. City of Philadelphia is a case that clearly articulates the essence of a statute of repose: “Where a limitations period begins with a definitely established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the statute is considered to be one of repose.” City of Phila., 132 A.3d at 953. Moreover, Gidor’s position is obviously contradicted by the repetitive pronouncements that the Construction Statute of Repose is a statute of repose because it is triggered by the “completion of construction[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a). We have explained that the twelve-year repose period does not begin running until “the entire construction project is so completed that it can be used by the general public[,]” Noll, 643 A.2d at 84, a point that is unrelated to the conduct of any party to a lawsuit. In the residential construction context, the Superior Court has further specified that the completion point is the moment a certificate of occupancy is issued. Venema v. Moser Builders, Inc., 2022 PA Super 171, 284 A.3d 208, 213 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that the twelve-year repose period commences when a certificate of occupancy for a residential home is issued because that is the first time third parties can be exposed to defects in the design, planning, or construction of the residence). The “completion of construction” is an independent act, unrelated to injurious conduct or the discovery of it. Thus, it is clear that Pennsylvania law does not require a repose period to be triggered by a defendant’s act. Finding Section 7512 to be a statute of repose, we have no basis to analyze Gidor’s secondary arguments seeking to resolve the non-existent ambiguity. See Woodford v. Commonwealth Ins. Dep’t, 663 Pa. 614, 243 A.3d 60, 73 (Pa. 2020) (“When the text of the statute is ambiguous, then—and only then—do we advance beyond its plain language and look to other considerations to discern the General Assembly’s intent.”). Accordingly, all arguments by Gidor concerning the utilization of the canons of construction to interpret an ambiguous statute are irrelevant.
Section 7512 is a statute of repose because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.
Concur by: WECHT
