Scheibe v. Resort, 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 225 (May 20, 2025) Lane, J.
On Tuesday, July 11, 2023, six days before the applicable two-year statute of limitations was due to expire on Monday, July 17, 2023, the Scheibes’ counsel mailed an electronically signed copy of a praecipe for writ of summons through the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) Express, one-day delivery, with tracking from a post office in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania, to the Pike County Prothonotary’s Office in Milford, Pennsylvania. The USPS tracking information reflects that the praecipe for writ of summons was delivered to the prothonotary’s office at 4:42 p.m. on Wednesday, July 12, 2023. However, the prothonotary’s office did not docket the praecipe on Wednesday, July 12, 2023, nor on Thursday, July 13, 2023, nor on Friday, July 14, 2023.
Instead, on the morning of Monday, July 17, 2023, which was the date on which the statute of limitations was set to expire, a clerk from the prothonotary’s office called the Scheibes’ counsel and stated that the office was refusing to docket the praecipe because it had an electronic signature and lacked an original signature as required by Pike County Local Rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii) (providing that “[a]ll papers filed shall be endorsed with the name, address, telephone number, original signature and I.D. number of the attorney filing it”). Counsel attempted to explain to the prothonotary that the praecipe and cover letter complied with the relevant Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, and also included counsel’s name, address, telephone number, electronic signature, and identification number. However, the prothonotary rejected the praecipe and refused to file it based on its non-conformity to the original signature requirement of local rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii). Counsel then prepared a hand-signed praecipe which he sent via overnight mail on July 17, 2023. The hand-signed praecipe was received by the prothonotary’s office on July 18, 2023, the day after the statute of limitations expired. The prothonotary then accepted the document for filing based on its conformity with local rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii). The only difference between the two praecipes mailed by counsel was the signature, one being electronic and the other being hand-signed.
The two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions commenced on the date of the accident, July 15, 2021, and would ordinarily be set to expire on July 15, 2023. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). However, because July 15, 2023, fell on a Saturday, the Scheibes had until Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence their negligence action against Woodloch. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing that when a statutory filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the deadline is extended to the next business day).
We conclude that because the two-year statute of limitations expired on a weekend, here Saturday July 15, 2023, the Scheibes had until Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence their negligence action against Woodloch. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. A similar situation occurred in Griffin, where the motor vehicle accident at issue in the litigation occurred on April 18, 1997. Pursuant to section 5524(2), the appellants were required to institute their civil action no later than April 18, 1999. However, April 18, 1999, fell on a Sunday. Therefore, pursuant to section 1908, appellants were instead required to commence the action by Monday, April 19, 1999. See Griffin, 823 A.2d at 200. Likewise, in this case, because the two-year statute of limitations expired on Saturday, July 15, 2023, the Scheibes had until the next business day, Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence the instant action. Thus, the trial court erred when it determined that the Scheibes were required to file their praecipe for writ of summons by Saturday, July 15, 2023.
There is no requirement in Rule 205.1 that an attorney must provide a handwritten signature on a pleading. See id.; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1(b) (requiring only that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper directed to the court shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party”). Indeed, pursuant to Rule 76, a “signature” for purposes of a civil action includes a “computer generated signature” and a “signature created . . . by electronic means” by the signer. Pa.R.C.P. 76.
In the wake of Griffin, this Court has focused on the date of receipt of a document by the prothonotary’s office, and determined that date to be the date of filing regardless of when the document is later time-stamped or docketed. See Nagy v. Best Home Servs., 829 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Super 2003) (applying Griffin and holding that the notice of appeal was filed when it was received by the prothonotary within the thirty-day appeal period, notwithstanding the prothonotary’s refusal to accept the notice for filing because it was unsigned and did not attach a copy of the judgment); see also Mariano v. Rhodes, 270 A.3d 521, 528 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying Griffin and holding that, for purposes of time computation, a document is filed when it was received by the prothonotary, notwithstanding that document’s nonconformity with regular procedure); Cogley v. Duncan, 32 A.3d 1288, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that, “[a]s we stated in Griffin, as long as the complaint complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the date on which the complaint arrives at the prothonotary’s office is the date on which it is filed, regardless of when it is time-stamped”).
While the prothonotary must inspect documents that are sent for filing to ensure they are in the proper form, the power to reject such documents is limited to notifying the proper party that the document is defective so that the defect may be corrected through amendment or addendum. See Nagy, 829 A.2d at 1170. Permitting the prothonotary to reject potentially non-conforming legal documents would “confer on the prothonotary the power to implement the Rules” and make judicial timeliness determinations. Mariano, 270 A.3d at 529 (quoting Nagy, 829 A.2d at 1170). The prothonotary has no discretion in this matter nor does it act in a judicial capacity. See Nagy, 829 A.2d at 1169-70. Instead, the powers of the prothonotary are “purely ministerial in nature.” Always Busy Consulting, LLC v. Babford & Co., 247 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa. 2021). A prothonotary exceeds its authority when it rejects a civil pleading filed within time limits, and such rejection does not affect the timeliness of the document.
We additionally conclude that the prothonotary had no authority to reject the praecipe for filing on the basis that it lacked an original signature, as required by local rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii). There is no suggestion in this matter that the praecipe failed to comply with any statewide Rule of Civil Procedure. at 1167. See Griffin, 823 A.2d at 202 (holding that, as long as the legal document complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the date on which the document arrives at the prothonotary’s office is the date on which it is filed, regardless of when it is time-stamped). Instead, the sole basis for rejection was the lack of an original signature, as required by the local rule. Thus, the prothonotary’s rejection of the praecipe was in direction contravention of Rule 205.2, which provides that “[n]o pleading or other legal paper that complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be refused for filing by the prothonotary based on a requirement of a local rule of civil procedure or judicial administration . . ..” Pa.R.C.P. 205.2. While the prothonotary could inspect the praecipe for compliance, and inform the Scheibes of any defect, the prothonotary was still required to accept the praecipe for filing. See Mariano, 270 A.3d at 529. Therefore, because the prothonotary should have accepted the praecipe for filing upon its initial receipt of that document within the statute of limitations, we conclude that the trial court erred by determining that the praecipe was not timely filed and by granting Woodloch’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis. We therefore vacate the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
