COVID-19-EVICICTIONS OF TENANTS
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3679 (August 26, 2021). PER CURIAM. The Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has imposed a nationwide moratorium on evictions of any tenants who live in a county that is experiencing substantial or high levels of COVID–19 transmission and who make certain declarations of financial need. 86 Fed. Reg. 43244 (2021). The Alabama Association of Realtors (along with other plaintiffs) obtained a judgment from the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia vacating the moratorium on the ground that it is unlawful. But the District Court stayed its judgment while the Government pursued an appeal. We vacate that stay, rendering the judgment enforceable. The District Court produced a comprehensive opinion concluding that the statute on which the CDC relies does not grant it the authority it claims. The case has been thoroughly briefed before us— twice. And careful review of that record makes clear that the applicants are virtually certain to succeed on the merits of their argument that the CDC has exceeded its authority. It would be one thing if Congress had specifically authorized the action that the CDC has taken. But that has not happened. Instead, the CDC has imposed a nationwide moratorium on evictions in reliance on a decades-old statute that authorizes it to implement measures like fumigation and pest extermination. It strains credulity to believe that this statute grants the CDC the sweeping authority that it asserts. In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act to alleviate burdens caused by the burgeoning COVID–19 pandemic. Pub. L. 116–136, 134 Stat. 281. Among other relief programs, the Act imposed a 120-day eviction moratorium for properties that participated in federal assistance programs or were subject to federally backed loans. §4024, id., at 492–494. When the eviction moratorium expired in July, Congress did not renew it. Concluding that further action was needed, the CDC decided to do what Congress had not. See 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (2020). The new, administratively imposed moratorium went further than its statutory predecessor, covering all residential properties nationwide and imposing criminal penalties on violators. See id., at 55293, 55296.
LANDLORD-TENANT-DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT
Gamesa Energy United States v. Ten Penn Center Associates, 2019 Pa. LEXIS 5441 (S. Ct. September 26, 2019) Dougherty, J. We granted discretionary review of this commercial landlord and tenant dispute to determine whether the Superior Court erred in holding the tenant was limited to damages for breach of contract and could not also recover the rent it paid following the landlord’s breach, despite prevailing on its claims for both remedies at trial. After careful review, we affirm.
Landlord Tenant Slip and Fall
Hackett v. Indian King Residents Ass’n., 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 937 (August 29, 2018) Shogan, J. This is an appeal by Plaintiff-Appellant, Ruthann Hackett, following a jury’s defense verdict in favor of Appellee, Indian King Residents Association (“IKRA”). Following our careful review, we affirm. Appellant sued to recover for injuries from a fall caused by branches on steps in a common area leading to her townhouse.
The trial court did not err in finding that Appellant was a licensee when she entered the common area. It is undisputed that Appellant was not a trespasser at the time she fell. Initially, we reject outright Appellant’s claim that she was an invitee pursuant to the Uniform Condominium Act. Appellant’s Brief at 21–22. Appellant cites no case law in support of her position, but more significantly, we note the inapplicability of the UCA. IKRA is not a condominium association; it is a homeowners’ association under the UPCA, as noted supra. The UCA has no relevance to this case. Further, Appellant was not an invitee because she was not a business visitor at the Indian King Community nor on the property by invitation or for a purpose related to IKRA’s business dealing. The Restatement, § 332. Rather, she was returning to her home after visiting a relative. N.T., 7/31/17, at 35, 48. Appellant likewise was not a public invitee. The Restatement, § 332. There was no evidence offered that Appellant entered the property upon invitation or for a purpose for which land is held open to the public. As noted by the trial court, Comment b to Section 332 of the Restatement “addresses the requirement of an invitation to distinguish an invitee from a licensee.” The fall was in the common area. Plaintiff was a resident of Indian King Community. In such a situation, plaintiff is not invited onto the common area. She was there with implied permission by virtue of the fact that she was a resident. She had longstanding permission to use the area