LAND OWNER’S LIABILITY – TRESPASSER – BICYCLE – LIABILITY

Harris v. Hutchinson Sportsmen’s Club, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 69 (February 4, 2026) Murray, J. BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.
Scott Harris (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson Sportsmen’s Club (HSC) and South Union Township (the Township), and dismissing Appellant’s action for damages for personal injuries he sustained from a fall on a road located on HSC’s property. After careful review, we affirm.
Despite claiming, in his principal brief, that the “raised portion of the road” was the dangerous condition that caused his injuries, in his reply brief, Appellant concedes that the road condition that caused his fall is unknown to him. Acknowledging the open and obvious nature of the “hole” and “raised portion of road” on HSC’s property, Appellant claims his deposition testimony established that neither condition caused his fall. Instead, Appellant maintains, in his attempt to avoid these conditions in the road, Appellant “encountered another condition in the road, not open and obvious, which actually caused his fall.”
Here, the trial court concluded that, regardless of Appellant’s status as an entrant upon HSC’s property, Appellant failed to set forth a prima facie case for negligence.
A possessor of land is liable for bodily harm to a licensee for a natural or artificial condition on the land only if he a) knows of the condition, realizes it involves an unreasonable risk, and has reason to believe that the licensee will not discover the condition or realize the risk[;] and b) invites or permits [the licensee] to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe, or to warn [the licensee] of the condition and the risk involved therein. See Oswald v. Hausman, 548 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa. Super. 1988). The liability to a licensee is not based upon a duty to maintain the land in a safe condition[,] but rather on the duty to disclose the risk they will encounter if they accept his invitation or permission.
[Appellant’s] deposition testimony does not establish whether he lost control of the [electric bicycle] due to the speed bump or due to a pothole in the road near the speed bump. … [Appellant] has not cited any evidence in the record to show that [HSC] knew of the condition, realized it involved an unreasonable risk[,] and had reason to believe that the condition would not be discovered or that a person would not realize the risk. On the contrary, the conditions in the road (both the hole and the speed bump) were clearly visible; [Appellant] admitted that he saw them and steered toward the right-hand side of the road to avoid the deepest part of the hole. Further, [Appellant] has not established in the record that the speed bump was a dangerous condition, or if, in fact, the speed bump was even the actual cause of [Appellant’s] accident, as a speed bump is typically used as a safety measure to slow down traffic.
Bicycling on a roadway carries certain known risks, and riding an unfamiliar electric power[- ]assisted [bicycle] on a roadway arguably carries additional risks due to the higher speeds possible and additional complexity in operating the [bicycle]. Encountering potholes and speed bumps are reasonably foreseeable conditions and risks a bicyclist may expect to encounter. … Therefore, even if the [c]ourt were to consider [Appellant] a licensee at the time of the accident, [Appellant] still failed to establish liability on [HSC’s] part.
As set forth at length above, in arriving at its conclusion that Appellant failed to set forth a prima facie case for negligence, the trial court relied upon admissions in Appellant’s deposition testimony. See Carrender, 469 A.2d at 123 (“Although the question of whether a danger was known or obvious is usually a question of fact for the jury, the question may be decided by the court where reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion.” (citation omitted)). Upon review, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in considering Appellant’s own statements, and its determination, derived therefrom, that no genuine issues of material facts exist as to HSC’s liability in this negligence action. See Shellenberger, 288 A.3d at 905; Gray, 671 A.2d at 1172 n.1. Appellant’s second and third issues merit no relief. Order affirmed.
• Appellant took his electric bike for a ride.
• He fell on a speed bump and got hurt.
• Summary judgment properly granted.
• Plaintiff appellant acknowledged the open and obvious nature of the hole and the raised portion of the road.
• Possessor of land is liable for bodily injury to a licensee for a natural or artificial condition on the land, only if he knows of the condition, realizes it involves a reasonable risk and had reason to believe that the licensee will not discover the risk.
• The Court also defines a trespasser.
• Biking on roadway carries certain known risks, including riding on unfamiliar electric-powered assisted bicycles.
• Appellant failed to set forth a prima facie case for negligence.
• The danger was known or obvious.