INSURANCE – FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW – UNDERINSURANCE – SIGN DOWN – FORMS – CORRECT POLICY NUMBER – INVALID SIGN DOWN

Hartsek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 268087 (December 31, 2025. Christy Criswell Weigand, USDJ.
Mr. Hartsek argues his intent is irrelevant. Id. at 7. Mr. Hartsek instead contends that the form he signed is “technically invalid” under Section 1734 of the MVFRL because it bears the number of the existing policy rather than the new policy.
State Farm contends that Mr. Hartsek’s rigid interpretation of Section 1734 is contradicted by two Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions that declined to impose additional requirements to effectuate a valid request for lower UM/UIM coverage limits under Section 1734: Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 568 Pa. 105, 793 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2002) and Orsag v. Farmers New Century Ins., 609 Pa. 388, 15 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2011). The Court agrees with State Farm.
In Lewis, plaintiffs signed a single form in which they requested both a lower UM coverage limit and a lower UIM coverage limit. After they were injured in an automobile collision, the Lewis plaintiffs sought UIM benefits equal to the bodily injury liability limit in their insurance policy, arguing that the form they signed selecting lower UM/UIM coverage was invalid under the MVFRL. The Lewis plaintiffs specifically pointed to Section 1731’s requirement that the form for rejection of UM be printed on a separate page from a form rejecting UIM coverage. Id. According to the Lewis plaintiffs, because the form they signed did not comply with the technical requirements of Section 1731, and because Section 1731 explicitly “void[s]” any form that does not comply with its requirements, the form they signed was void for any purpose, including for requesting lower UIM benefits under Section 1734.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ invitation to “require actual execution of a [Section 1731] waiver/rejection form as an essential prerequisite to every Section 1734 specific-limits request.” The court instead held “that the technical and remedial prescriptions of Section 1731 . . . apply solely in circumstances in which an insurer attempts to enforce outright waiver/rejection of UM/UIM coverage.” The Lewis court thus ruled that the plaintiffs validly requested lower UM/UIM coverage under Section 1734.
In both Lewis and Orsag, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that “all that is required to request lower limits of [UM/UIM] coverage is a writing requesting the same from a named insured.” Orsag, 15 A.3d 896 at 900 (quoting Lewis, 793 A.2d at 153). Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Hartsek signed a form selecting “lower limit[s]” of $50,000 in UIM coverage for the policy he requested on July 11, 2019, “in lieu of the higher limits made available to” him. Because the signed form manifested Mr. Hartsek’s desire to purchase lower UIM coverage and includes an express designation of the amount of UIM coverage, the form complies with Section 1734’s requirements. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s repeated refusal to impose additional requirements for a valid request for lower UM/UIM coverage compels this Court’s conclusion that the reference to the existing policy number did not render the form noncompliant with Section 1734.
State Farm argues that the underinsured coverage limits form Mr. Hartsek signed was unambiguously intended to apply to the new policy. Mr. Hartsek contends that the form’s reference to the existing policy number renders the form ambiguous as to which policy it applied to. Mr. Hartsek notes that, under Pennsylvania law, any ambiguity in an insurance policy provision “is to be construed in favor of the policyholder and against the insurer[.]” Kurach v. Truck Ins. Exch., 661 Pa. 176, 235 A.3d 1106, 1116 (2020). Therefore, Mr. Hartsek argues, the Court must resolve that ambiguity in his favor and interpret the request for lower UM/UIM coverage as applying to the existing policy only.
Mr. Hartsek acknowledges that he intended his request for lower UM/UIM coverage limits to apply to the new policy. Under Pennsylvania law, “[w]hen, at the time of formation, the parties attach the same meaning to a contract term and each party is aware of the other’s intended meaning, or has reason to be so aware, the contract is enforceable in accordance with that meaning.” T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 42 A.3d 261, 283 n.5 (2012). Mr. Hartsek points to no authority suggesting this principle does not apply with equal force in the context of an insurance contract. The Court therefore finds that, viewing the stipulated facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Hartsek as the non-moving party, the underinsured coverage limits form Mr. Hartsek signed unambiguously manifests his intent to request lower UM/UIM coverage limits for the new policy. The form is thus enforceable in accordance with that meaning.
• Policy holder argued that his intent is irrelevant and that the form he signed was invalid under 1734 of the law because it bears the number of the existing policy rather than the new policy.
• The Court finds that irrelevant.
• Clearly, the insured intended to sign a form for the new policy, regardless of the mistake by the insurance company in terms of the policy number.
• Mr. Hartsek, the policy holder, acknowledges the intended request for lower UM/UIM coverage limits to apply to the new policy. That ends the argument.