Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. McNear, 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 95 (Pa. Superior Ct., February 26, 2025) (Sullivan, J.)
Valerie McNear appeal for summary judgement granted in favor of Goodville Mutual Insurance Company.
In 2012, Karen initially signed an election form for less-than-full underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage, and she selected benefits of $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident, stacked across the three vehicles covered by the policy. The McNears renewed their policy every six months, and between 2012 and 2018, they added and removed vehicles, with the policy covering as many as four and as few as two vehicles. Goodville did not obtain new limited UIM elections when the McNears added vehicles to their policy, nor did the McNears affirmatively request changes to their UIM benefits or other coverages. By 2018, the McNears’ policy again covered three vehicles.
In 2018, Mallory was injured in a car accident caused by Mary Thomas (“Thomas”). Mallory recovered up to the limits of Thomas’s insurance. Mallory then filed a claim with Goodville for UIM benefits. Goodville paid Mallory $150,000, based on the stacked $50,000 limited UIM benefits Karen originally selected in 2012 and the three vehicles covered at the time. The McNears disputed this amount, asserting the additions of vehicles to their policy constituted new “purchases” of coverage which required Goodville to obtain new UIM selections. Because Goodville failed to obtain new limited UIM selections, the McNears claimed, it was obliged to pay full UIM benefits up to the bodily injury benefits of their policy—i.e., $250,000 stacked across three vehicles, or $750,000. Goodville rejected the claim for full UIM benefits and commenced the underlying action for a judgment declaring it fulfilled its obligation to pay the limited UIM benefits Karen originally selected in 2012. Goodville subsequently moved for summary judgment, and the McNears answered and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
Following our review of the relevant provisions of the MVFRL, we discern no error in the trial court’s analysis of the statute and persuasive case law. Section 1734 requires only that the insurer “issue” UIM coverage in the amount selected by a named insured in a writing signed by a named insured. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1734; Blood, 934 A.2d at 1226. Section 1791 permits an insurer to rely on elections and notices regarding the availability of UIM benefits at the time of application for original coverage. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791; Koch, 280 A.3d at 1068; Smith, 849 A.2d at 281. Because it is undisputed that Karen completed a “sign-down” selecting limited UIM coverage; neither Karen nor Todd (the named insureds on the policy) affirmatively requested a change, in writing, to UIM coverage; and the McNears did object to any defects in the section 1791 notices they received at the time Karen applied for coverage, we agree with the trial court that Karen’s original “sign-down” remained effective at the time Mallory suffered injuries caused by an underinsured motorist. Moreover, pursuant to section 1791, Goodville was under no obligation to provide additional notices regarding the limited UIM benefits Karen had originally selected.
The Court examined Barnard decision 216 Atl. 3d., at 1052. In Barnard, the Supreme Court concluded that an insurance decision to increase the UIM benefits she originally selected constituted a “purchase” of coverage within the meaning of Section 1738.
Thus, we decline the McNears’ invitation to apply Barnard broadly to hold that an addition of a vehicle required Goodville to obtain a new “sign-down.” The McNears are correct that sections 1731, 1734, and 1738, in the broadest sense, all relate to an amount of UIM benefits the insured may receive under a policy. However, section 1731’s singular use of the term “purchase” occurs in a wholly different context than section 1738. Compare 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731 (stating that the purchase of UM and UIM coverage is optional) with 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738 (stating a purchase of UM or UIM coverage for more than one vehicle under a policy gives rise to an opportunity to waive the stacked limits of coverage); accord Koch, 280 A.3d at 1068. Crucially, section 1734, which more specifically governs selections of limited UIM benefits, does not use the term “purchase” at all. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1734. A more complete reading of section 1734 further negates any surface appeal to the McNears’ repeated argument that coverage cannot issue without a purchase. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1734 (stating that a named insured may request the issuance of coverages under section 1731); see also Blood, 934 A.2d at 1226 (indicating that the insurer’s obligation to issue UIM benefits under section 1734 is triggered by the insured’s written request, or lack thereof). Furthermore, neither section 1731 nor section 1734 use the term “purchase” in a comparable context to section 1738, and, significantly, sections 1731 and 1734 do not speak to an insured’s opportunities to waive or select UIM benefits after making an initial selection. Cf. Koch, 280 A.3d at 1068.
Thus, a review of MVFRL and the case law clarifies that the General Assembly used different terms when regulating different things, namely, the waiver of any amount of UIM benefits under section 1731, an affirmative selection of less than full UIM benefits under section 1734, and the opportunity to stack across multiple vehicles under section 1738. See Lewis, 793 A.2d at 153. Although section 1791 does not assist in an interpretation of section 1738’s waiver of stacking requirement, see Barnard, 216 A.3d at 1052, section 1791 still informs the interpretation of sections 1731 and 1734. Cf. Koch, 280 A.3d at 1068. For these reasons, Barnard’s construction of the term “purchase” in section 1738, does not control the effectiveness of a named insured’s original selection of limited UIM coverage or the insurer’s purported obligation to obtain a new “sign-down” under section 1731 and 1734 when there is an addition of a vehicle to a policy.
In sum, having reviewed the facts, arguments, and law relevant to this appeal, we conclude that this case is best decided by the principle that once Karen selected limited UIM benefits when applying for original coverage, Goodville was entitled to presume that her selection remained effective until affirmatively changed by a named insured. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1734, 1791; cf. Barnard, 216 A.3d at 1053; Koch, 280 A.3d at 1067. This conclusion is consistent with what the text of section 1734 says and does not say; Barnard’s view that stacking was not one of the matters included in section 1791; and related case law, which this Court most recently reaffirmed in Koch. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Goodville and against the McNears.
