Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton, 145 S. Ct. 2291 (June 27, 2025) Thomas, J.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Texas, like many States, prohibits the distribution of sexually explicit content to children. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §43.24(b) (West 2016). But, although that prohibition may be effective against brick-and-mortar stores, it has proved challenging to enforce against online content. To address this problem, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §129B.001 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 2024), which requires certain commercial websites that publish sexually explicit content to verify the ages of their visitors. This requirement furthers the lawful end of preventing children from accessing sexually explicit content. But it also burdens adult visitors of these websites, who all agree have a First Amendment right to access at least some of the content that the websites publish. We granted certiorari to decide whether these burdens likely render H. B. 1181 unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. We hold that they do not. The power to require age verification is within a state’s authority to prevent children from accessing sexually explicit content. H. B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of that authority.
The First Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” As “a general matter,” this provision “means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this principle “is not absolute.” Ibid.
To determine whether a law that regulates speech violates the First Amendment, we must consider both the nature of the burden imposed by the law and the nature of the speech at issue. Our precedents distinguish between two types of restrictions on protected speech: content-based laws and content-neutral laws. “Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if” they satisfy strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015). That standard requires that a law be “the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 478, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 189 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2014).
Content-neutral laws, on the other hand, “are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994) (citation omitted). Under that standard, a law will survive review “if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 189, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1997) (Turner II).
At the same time, not all speech is protected. “‘From 1791 to the present,’” certain “‘historic and traditional categories’” of speech—such as “obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct”—have been understood to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010) (citations omitted). States generally may prohibit speech of this kind without “rais[ing] any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942). Such prohibitions are subject only to rational-basis review, the minimum constitutional standard that all legislation must satisfy. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 628, n. 27, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008). Under that standard, a law will be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for its enactment. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993).
This Court has applied these principles to regulations of internet-based speech on two prior occasions, both at the dawn of the internet age. First, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997), we addressed the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 110 Stat. 133. The CDA criminalized using the internet to knowingly transmit “obscene or indecent messages” to a minor, or to knowingly send or display “patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to” a minor. 521 U. S., at 859-860, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874. It provided an affirmative defense to “those who restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof.” Id., at 860-861, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874.
Requiring age verification is common when a law draws lines based on age. For example, Texas, like many States, requires proof of age to obtain alcohol, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. §106.03(b) (2020); tobacco, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§161.082(d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 2024); a lottery ticket; 5 a tattoo, 25 Tex. Admin. Code §§229.406(a), (b) (2024); a body piercing, ibid.; fireworks, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §2154.252(c) (2019); and a driver’s license, Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §521.142(a) (2018). Federal law similarly mandates age verification to obtain certain medications from a pharmacist, 21 CFR §§1306.26(c), (d) (2024), or to obtain employment as a minor, 29 CFR §570.5 (2024). Fundamental rights that turn on age are no different. Texas, again like many States, requires proof of age to obtain a handgun license, Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §411.174(a)(3) (2019); to register to vote, Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§13.002(c)(2), (8) (2020); and to marry, Tex. Fam. Code §2.005(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024). In none of these contexts is the constitutionality of a reasonable, bona fide age-verification requirement disputed. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 38-39, n. 9, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 202-203, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 170 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, 98 S. Ct. 673, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1978).
Strict scrutiny—which requires a restriction to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest—is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 534, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997). In the First Amendment context, we have held only once that a law triggered but satisfied strict scrutiny—to uphold a federal statute that prohibited knowingly providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 27-39, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2010). That case involved an unusual application of strict scrutiny, since our analysis relied on the “deference” due to the Executive’s “evaluation of the facts” in the context of “national security and foreign affairs.” Id., at 33-34, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355.
Strict scrutiny is unforgiving because it is the standard for reviewing the direct targeting of fully protected speech. Reed, 576 U. S., at 163, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236. Strict scrutiny is designed to enforce “the fundamental principle that governments have no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. 755, 766, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). It succeeds in that purpose if and only if, as a practical matter, it is fatal in fact absent truly extraordinary circumstances. Strict scrutiny therefore cannot apply to laws, such as in-person age-verification requirements, which are traditional, widespread, and not thought to raise a significant First Amendment issue.
Texas, like the Fifth Circuit, contends that intermediate scrutiny is too demanding, and that only rational-basis review applies. This position fails to account for the incidental burden that age verification necessarily has on an adult’s First Amendment right to access speech that is obscene only to minors. Rational basis is the appropriate standard for laws that do not implicate “fundamental constitutional rights” at all. Beach Communications, 508 U. S., at 313, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211. Intermediate scrutiny, which is deferential but not toothless, plays an important role in ensuring that legislatures do not use ostensibly legitimate purposes to disguise efforts to suppress fundamental rights.
A statute survives intermediate scrutiny if it “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner II, 520 U. S., at 189, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369. H. B. 1181 readily satisfies these requirements.
H. B. 1181 simply requires adults to verify their age before they can access speech that is obscene to children. It is therefore subject only to intermediate scrutiny, which it readily survives. The statute advances the State’s important interest in shielding children from sexually explicit content. And it is appropriately tailored because it permits users to verify their ages through the established methods of providing government-issued identification and sharing transactional data. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Dissent by: KAGAN
• Texas statute requires age verification on websites.
• The court said that the level of scrutiny is “intermediate” and not the highest level of scrutiny possible in a first amendment context.
• Not all speech is protected.
• The Court has previously looked at age verification issues, where sexually explicit materials are involved.
• The Court has a lengthy discussion about strict scrutiny of a statute as opposed to intermediate scrutiny.
• The Texas statute simply requires adults to verify their age before they can access speech that is obscene to children.
• It is only subject to intermediate scrutiny, for which the statute readily survives.
• The state has an important interest in shielding children from sexually explicit content.
• The statute is appropriately tailored because it permits users to verify their ages through established methods of providing government-issued information and sharing transactional data.
• Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
• Dissent by Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson joined dissenting.
