Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 223 L. Ed. 2d 357 (January 14, 2026) Before the Supreme Court of the United States.
Judges: Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kagan, J., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Three political candidates challenged Illinois’s procedure for counting mail-in ballots received after election day. We consider whether the candidates have standing to maintain their suit.
Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have a “personal stake” in a case to have standing to sue. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379, 144 S. Ct. 1540, 219 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2024). They must, in other words, be able to answer a basic question: “‘What’s it to you?’” A. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983). Congressman Bost has an obvious answer: He is a candidate for office. And a candidate has a personal stake in the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.
Candidates, in short, are not “mere bystanders” in their own elections. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 110, 145 S. Ct. 2121, 222 L. Ed. 2d 370 (2025). They have an obvious personal stake in how the result is determined and regarded. Departures from the preordained rules cause them particularized and concrete harm.5 The same is true of competitors in other contests. Each runner in a 100-meter dash, for example, would suffer if the race were unexpectedly extended to 105 meters. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 90. Whether a particular runner expects to finish strong or fall off the pace in the final five meters, all would be deprived of the chance to compete for the prize that the rules define. The fastest to run 105 meters has not won the 100-meter dash. And in much the same way, an unlawful extension of vote counting deprives candidates of the opportunity to compete for election under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Even if some candidates could muster evidence well before election day that a rule will likely be outcome determinative, respondents’ and the dissent’s approach would convert Article III judges into political prognosticators and “invite[ ] findings on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else can have any confidence.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 711, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 204 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a number of prominent historical figures can attest, not least among them Charles Evans Hughes and Thomas Dewey, “accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a “simple” endeavor. Id., at 712, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 204 L. Ed. 2d 931. And if the prognosticators themselves lack the “political clairvoyance” to predict the winner after all votes have been cast, then surely judges are poorly positioned to assess whether a candidate’s risk of loss, months earlier, is substantial. Diamond Alternative Energy, 606 U. S., at 123, 145 S. Ct. 2121, 222 L. Ed. 2d 370; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 287, n. 8, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion). The limits of federal courts’ jurisdiction do not rest upon such “unstable ground outside judicial expertise.” Rucho, 588 U. S., at 713, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 204 L. Ed. 2d 931.
Judges are no better qualified to make such determinations than they are to assess a candidate’s likelihood of winning or losing. Even if they could do so, this approach would still channel many disputes into postelection litigation. To bring a preelection suit, a candidate would have to plead and prove that voters who take advantage of the challenged rule will favor his rivals. Doing so while campaigning for those same voters’ support is not just awkward, but politically dangerous. Particularly for new election rules, it may require divulging information about vulnerabilities that rival candidates could exploit. Faced with that prospect, many candidates are sure to wait until after votes are counted to sue.
Nothing about Article III requires this result. Candidates have a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns. Their interest extends to the integrity of the election—and the democratic process by which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to represent.
“Courts sometimes make standing law more complicated than it needs to be.” Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 590 U. S. 538, 547, 140 S. Ct. 1615, 207 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2020). We decline respondents’ invitation to do so here. As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
• Political candidates challenge Illinois procedures for counting mail-in ballots received after Election Day.
• Candidates have standing to maintain their suit.
• Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs have a personal stake in the case and therefore have standing to sue.
• Candidates are not mere bystanders to their own elections.
• Candidates have an obvious personal stake in how the results are determined and regarded.
